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ABSTRACT 
Anyone can buy stock in a public company, but not all shareholders are equally committed 
to a company’s long-term success. In an increasingly fragmented financial world, shareholders’ 
attitudes toward the companies in which they invest vary widely, from time horizon to conviction. 
Faced with indexers, short-term traders, and activists, it is more important than ever for businesses 
to ensure that their shareholders are dedicated to their missions. Today’s companies need “quality 
shareholders,” as Warren Buffett called those who “load up and stick around,” or buy large stakes 
and hold for long periods.  
While scholars in recent years have extensively debated indexers, short-term traders, and 
activists, they have paid scant attention to quality shareholders and their critical role in corporate 
finance and governance. This Article corrects this oversight by highlighting the quality 
shareholder cohort. Adding this fresh perspective confirms some of the angst about myopic short-
termism on the one hand and ignorant indexing on the other, but rather than regulate related 
behaviors, the fresh perspective invites attention to empowering quality shareholders. In 
particular, rather than taxing short-term shareholders or passing through indexer voting rights, 
this Article explains how companies could simply increase the voting power of their quality 
shareholders.  
* * * * * 
This Article is part of The Quality Shareholder Initiative at the Center for Law, Economics 
and Finance (C-LEAF), at The George Washington University Law School, Prof. Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Faculty Director.  
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INTRODUCTION  
 The growing size and power of institutional investors is among the most important 
contemporary trends in American corporate life.1 In recent years, their rise has drawn special 
attention to shareholder activists on the one hand and passive index funds on the other. Lively 
debates address whether such powerful investors have the right vision or conviction to faithfully 
discharge the trust so many Americans have placed in them.  
 On vision, for two decades scholars have debated whether investors, especially activists, 
are too short-term oriented for markets and managers to maintain a long-term view.2 On 
conviction, just in the past two years scholars began to debate whether certain kinds of investors, 
particularly passive indexers, have sufficient incentives to actively monitor managers to assure 
performance over any horizon.3  In a related debate on shareholder voice in corporate affairs, some 
scholars propose reducing the voting power of short-term shareholders to encourage long-term 
thinking while others propose eliminating that of indexers due to their passivity.4 
 These are vital debates in corporate America, implicating fundamental questions of the 
balance of power between directors and shareholders as well as among shareholders. As such, they 
stoke numerous sub-debates on every aspect of corporate governance, such as board structures, 
director-officer relationships, and shareholder rights.5 Participants see wide-ranging effects on the 
national economy.6 
 Although such debates are sophisticated, increasingly data-driven, and involve overlapping 
participants, a peculiar binary characterizes the first two that afflicts the third. The horizon debate 
juxtaposes short-term against long-term visions but mutes the issue of conviction, while the 
conviction debate juxtaposes passive against active investment styles while muting the issue of 
 
 1 See John C. Coates, IV, The Future of Corporate Governance Part I: The Problem of Twelve 
(September 20, 2018) (available at www.ssrn.com/abstract=3247337) (the trend of rising power of 
institutional investors increases the “likelihood that in the near future roughly twelve individuals will have 
practical power over the majority of U.S. public companies”).  
 2 Lucian A. Bebchuk, The Case for Increasing Shareholder Power, 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833 (2005); 
Stephen M. Bainbridge, Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735 
(2006); William W. Bratton & Michael L. Wachter, The Case Against Shareholder Empowerment, 158 U. 
Pa. L. Rev. 655 (2010); Jesse M. Fried, The Uneasy Case for Favoring Long-Term Shareholders, 124 Yale 
L. J. 1554 (2015). 
 3 Compare Lucian A. Bebchuk & Scott Hirst, Index Funds and the Future of Corporate Governance: 
Theory, Evidence, and Policy, 119 Colum. L. Rev. 2029 (2019) (agency cost indictment of indexer 
capability) with Jill E. Fisch, Assaf Hamdani & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The New Titans of Wall Street: 
A Theoretical Framework for Passive Investors, 168 U. Pa. L. Rev. 17 (2019) [hereinafter Fisch, The New 
Titans] (ringing theoretical defense of indexer capability).  
 4 Paul H. Edelman, Wei Jiang & Randall S. Thomas, Will Tenure Voting Give Corporate Managers 
Lifetime Tenure?, 97 Tex. L. Rev. 991 (2019); Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder 
Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); David J. Berger, Steven Davidoff Solomon & Aaron Benjamin, Tenure 
Voting and the US Public Company, 72 Bus. Law. 295 (2017). 
 5 See infra Part II.C. 
 6 E.g., Berger, et al., supra note 4, at 307-309. 
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horizon. Hence in the voting debate, there are calls to limit voting power of both short-term 
shareholders or indexers, but not both.7  
 In fact, however, while time horizon and relative conviction are vital, neither taken alone 
captures the nuanced reality of investor behavior which, at a minimum, calls for examining both 
features simultaneously. This Article proposes to incorporate such concurrent analysis of horizon 
and conviction into all three of these corporate law debates. By switching from binary conceptions 
to one that combines both attributes, analysis permits recognizing another cohort of shareholders 
whose role has been missing in all three debates: long-term concentrated shareholders.   
 While contemporary data suggest that a large plurality of institutional shareholders qualify 
as short-term and another plurality as indexers, the long-term concentrated cohort remains a 
significant force in market and corporate behavior.8 It should accordingly have an important place 
in debates over horizon, conviction and voting.  
 This Article draws on related literature in finance and accounting, cited in these corporate 
law debates, delineating multiple shareholder types based on both horizon and conviction.9  To 
visualize the combined model, blended shareholder cohorts can be identified using a 2 x 2 diagram 
arraying investment conviction across the top and investment horizon down the side to reveal 
combinations of conviction and horizon. 
  
  
  
INVESTMENT CONVICTION  
    Lower Higher 
INVESTMENT  
HORIZON 
Shorter Transients   Activists   
Longer Indexers   Quality   
  To animate the approach, descriptive names are assigned: transients to shorter-
term/diversifiers; indexers to longer-term diversifiers; activists to shorter-term concentrators; and 
quality to longer-term concentrators. Investment conviction is measured by the degree of an 
investor’s portfolio diversification versus concentration, with lower conviction meaning the most 
 
 7 See infra Part IV. 
 8 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Quality Shareholders (forthcoming Columbia University Press 
2020) [hereinafter Cunningham, Quality Shareholders], Appendix. 
 9 Brian Bushee, Identifying and Attracting the “Right” Investors: Evidence on the Behavior of 
Institutional Investors, 16 J. App. Corp. Fin. 28, 29 (2004) [hereinafter Bushee, The “Right” Investors]; 
Lynne L. Dallas & Jordan M. Barry, Long-Term Shareholders and Time-Phased Voting, 40 Del. J. Corp. 
L. 541, 549 n.6 (2016). 
5 
 
diversified portfolio—epitomized by index investors.10 Investment horizon is measured by the 
investor’s average holding period in its investments.11 
 In corporate law scholarship, the horizon debate considers shorter versus longer investment 
horizons (lower left panels of the graph) while the conviction debate considers lower versus higher 
investment concentration (upper right panels in the graph).  Combining the two would shift the 
terms of debate from two pure binaries to an interactive quadrant (lower right panels of the graph).  
Three immediate normative consequences follow.  
 First, adding conviction to the horizon debate would unlock stalemates on fundamental 
issues addressing allocation of power between management and shareholders. In recent years, after 
two decades of intense discussion, the empirical evidence concerning whether short-termism is 
problematic remains inconclusive.12 One reason, however, is a tendency in this literature to 
overlook significant differences among investors in their relative concentration, not merely time 
horizons. It may be that short-term traders who also concentrate offset other perceived problems 
of short-termism. Segmenting quality shareholders in research could help to inform sub-debates 
on particular governance topics, such as board structures and director-manager relations.13 
 Second, including horizon in the indexing debate will illuminate equally fundamental 
issues about the allocation of power among shareholders. The literature has tended to compare and 
contrast passive indexers on the one hand with all other shareholder types as a whole, collectively 
dubbed “active.”14 This tendency overlooks distinctions among the active cohort, lumping together 
activists, transients and quality shareholders. Indexers may well engage too little, but so might 
transients, perhaps warranting giving quality shareholders a special place in corporate decision 
making. Likewise, transients may compare themselves to annualized index benchmarks, but 
quality shareholders do not, focusing instead on long-term results.15  
 That leads to the third and most specific implication, concerning shareholder voting. 
Combining shareholder conviction and shareholder time horizon opens new approaches to this 
ultimate feature of the debates’ normative implications.  To date, critics of short-termism prescribe 
enhanced voting rights for long-term shareholders, in order to encourage longer time horizons 
while critics of indexers prescribe excluding indexers from voting on the grounds of their passivity 
and ignorance; opponents of both have pushed back accordingly.16  
 The critics in both such sub-debates may both be right to propose reducing the power of 
transients and indexers, respectively. But the logic of combining the two critiques identifies a third 
 
 10 Martijn Cremes, Active Share and the Three Pillars of Active Management: Skill, Conviction, 
and Opportunity, 73 Fin. Analysts J. 61 (2017). 
 11 See Brian Bushee, The Influence of Institutional Investors on Myopic R&D Investment Behavior, 
73 Acc. Rev. 305, 330 (1998) [hereinafter Bushee, Myopic R&D]. 
 12 See Assaf Hamdani & Sharon Hannes, The Future of Shareholder Activism, 99 B.U.L. Rev. 971 
(2019) (symposium issue on the horizon debate); Elisabeth de Fontenay, The Myth of the Ideal Investor, 
41 Seattle L. Rev. 425 (2018) (symposium issue on the horizon debate). 
 13 See infra text accompanying notes 187-200. 
 14 See infra note 219. 
 15 See infra text accompanying notes 105-108. 
 16 See infra Part IV. 
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way: voting rules that reward longevity and conviction. Call it quality voting. It is the clearest and 
most important example of the many aspects of these three debates that would change by analyzing 
investor horizon and conviction in combination.  
 The stakes are high, as these debates touch fundamental issues in corporate governance. 
With the rise of institutional investors has come increasing shareholder voice on a wide range of 
matters, from director elections to say on executive pay and influence on corporate proposals 
spanning from climate change and gender diversity to strategic direction and corporate priorities.  
This Article is the first to offer a comprehensive view of quality shareholders, pointing to how 
their role should reshape these three debates. It proceeds as follows. 
 Part I presents the quadruple (2 x 2) typology of shareholder cohorts based upon time 
horizon and relative concentration. These are the recognized categories in the broader literature, 
and the two that dominate the respective debates on horizon and conviction. However, this 
discussion focuses not on the activist or indexer—well covered in the literature and reconsidered 
in ensuing Parts—but on the quality shareholder. While the quality shareholder is well-described 
elsewhere in corporate law scholarship, and more broadly in financial scholarship and general 
media, it has been virtually ignored in the corporate law debates on horizon, conviction and voting.  
 In the wider literature, the exemplar of quality shareholders are Warren Buffett and his 
company, Berkshire Hathaway. With a pedigree dating back to John Maynard Keynes and a 
following today commanding several trillions of dollars in invested assets, this cohort is vital. Its 
distinguishing features are a long-term view and concentrated portfolios, in stark contrast to 
transients and indexers. Part I introduces these investors, profiles their behavior, and demonstrates 
their competitive position and enduring force in the marketplace.17   
 Part II reviews the horizon debate. In thumbnail fashion, given the age and extent of this 
debate, it outlines the theoretical positions, empirical data, and normative legal implications. It 
then expands upon the quadruple classification scheme and how adding this approach can 
reinvigorate the horizon debate. While scholars cannot agree on whether short-termism is a 
problem, critics who believe it is may be comforted by the force of quality shareholders and 
defenders of the status quo may appreciate how such a contrast underscores additional limits of 
short-term behavior.  This Article illustrates the effects of adding quality shareholders using sub-
 
 17 Among corporate law professors, I may be uniquely suited to elaborate on Buffett and this cohort, 
having spent nearly three decades immersed in their ecosystem and publishing numerous articles and books 
about them.  See Stephen M. Bainbridge, Cunningham’s Latest Book on Warren Buffett, Professor 
Bainbridge Blog (July 21, 2014) (“Few people have done a better job of chronicling Warren Buffett’s 
illustrious career than Law Professor Lawrence Cunningham. I’ve read all of [his] Buffett books and have 
found each to be highly entertaining and informative.”). Work dates to the mid-1990s when I organized a 
law review symposium featuring 25 corporate law professors dissecting my collection of Buffett’s writings. 
See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Conversations from the Buffett Symposium, 19 Cardozo L. Rev. 719 
(1997); Warren E. Buffett & Lawrence A. Cunningham, The Essays of Warren Buffett: Lessons for 
Corporate America (5th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays]. Recent articles include 
Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Disintermediation: A Managerial Model for the Next Generation, 
50 Wake Forest L. Rev. 509 (2015); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Berkshire’s Blemishes: The Visible Costs 
of Buffett’s Managerial Model, 2016 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1. Recent books include Lawrence A. 
Cunningham, Berkshire Beyond Buffett: The Enduring Value of Values (Columbia University Press 2014); 
Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Margin of Trust: The Berkshire Business Model (Columbia 
University Press 2019).  
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debates over staggered boards and splitting versus combining the roles of board chairman and 
CEO. 
 Part III reviews the conviction debate. In somewhat more detail, given the nascent stage of 
this debate, it reviews the positions, data, and upshot. As a critique of the current literature’s focus 
on indexers versus all others (habitually called “active”), this delineates the active cohort further. 
Among lessons that are uncovered, scholars focus on formulaic incentive models that assume all 
“active” funds measure themselves against annual index benchmarks or growth in assets under 
management,18 whereas quality shareholders put no stock in such references.19 The result is that 
current research ignores the relevant incentives and must be expanded in order to increase its 
relevance and reliability. 
 Part IV turns to shareholder voting implications. This is the most obvious topic requiring 
updating to incorporate quality shareholders. After all, one upshot of the horizon debate is revived 
interest in voting power based on holding periods (“tenured voting”); one upshot of the conviction 
debate is new interest in reducing indexer voting power.  Logic dictates considering voting rules 
that do both, by increasing the voting power of quality shareholders.  
 Amid the fragmentation of the shareholder base and related debates, for instance, dual class 
voting structures have proliferated to insulate companies from pressures of shareholder activists.20 
Tenured voting has been advocated as a way to discourage short-term shareholdings21 while  
exclusionary voting is being proposed to dilute the voice of indexers, seen to lack requisite 
incentives or knowledge.22 All such proposals are reasonable responses to perceived imbalances. 
But they are all incomplete, and point to the validity of a more complete shareholder voting 
protocol, one based on both central behavioral tendencies of horizon and conviction.23  
 It is sometimes difficult to map theory onto practice, given the constraints of their different 
realms.24 This reality may partially explain why the quality shareholder cohort has not received 
the attention it should: it has been relatively easy to model and measure the incentives and profiles 
of activist shareholders and index funds while the quality shareholder cohort contains more 
numerous and idiosyncratic members. But by providing a behavioral profile along with data about 
their performance and roles, this Article offers the promise of theorizing the practice.    
I. QUALITY SHAREHOLDERS 
 This Part reviews the rise of the institutional investor industry, noting legal scholarship 
reviewing it, and ensuing shareholder fragmentation. It reviews attempts to classify this 
fragmented shareholder base, highlighting one that delineates according to normatively significant 
dimensions of both horizon and conviction. The combination introduces a new shareholder cohort 
 
 18 See infra text accompanying notes 215-217.  
 19 See infra text accompanying notes 105-108. 
 20 See infra Part IV.A. 
 21 See infra Part IV.B. 
 22 See infra Part IV.C.  
 23 See infra Part IV.D. 
 24 See Louis Lowenstein, Efficient Market Theory: Let the Punishment Fit the Crime, 51 Wash. & 
Lee L. Rev. 925, 925 (1994); Lynn A. Stout, The Mechanisms of Market Inefficiency: An Introduction to 
the New Finance, 28 Iowa J. Corp. L. 635, 639 (2003). 
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to longstanding corporate law debates: the quality shareholder. Its behavioral attributes are 
explained, along with the cohort’s competitive position, relative performance, and advantages this 
approach offers to companies and fellow investors.  
A. Fragmentation 
 In decades past, most shareholders were individuals. In 1965, for example, institutional 
investors held $436 billion of $1.4 trillion in total market capitalization, with nearly $1 trillion 
owned by individual households.25 Less than 15% of the market, or $100 billion, was held by the 
day’s mutual funds, pension funds, and insurance companies (respectively holding $36, $43, and 
$21 billion 5%, 6%, and 3%).26 
 With shareholders so dispersed, prominent corporate theorists had for decades described 
the challenge of corporate life as the “separation of ownership from control.”27 It would be difficult 
for shareholders to act collectively and often irrational for them to incur the costs necessary to 
monitor corporate management.28 In this structure, managers held the balance of power over 
corporate destiny—in American corporate finance, there were strong managers yet weak owners.29 
Corporate law’s principal task, then, was to mitigate the attendant agency costs.30 
 Post-1965, however, trends moved from individual to institutional ownership and, by the 
1990s, those trends had become so powerful that corporate law scholars came to believe that they 
might mitigate these historical problems.31 A promising agenda emerged to enable institutional 
investors to monitor management more effectively.32 Guidance was provided on what to expect, 
including realistic cautionary notes, but in general the rise of institutional investors held out great 
promise for corporate governance.33  
 These hopes, however, have been disappointed, as the rise of institutional investors altered 
but did not resolve the longstanding challenges. Today, institutions command the vast majority of 
 
 25 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States: 
Historical Annual Tables (1965-1974).  
 26 Id. 
 27 See Adolf A. Berle, Jr.& Gardiner C. Means, The Modern Corporation and Private Property 
(1933). 
 28 See Mancur Olson, The Logic of Collective Action (1965). 
 29 See Mark J. Roe, Strong Managers, Weak Owners: The Political Roots of American Corporate 
Finance (1994). 
 30 See Michael C. Jensen & William H. Meckling, Theory of the Firm: Managerial Behavior, 
Agency Costs and Ownership Structure, 3 J. Fin. Econ. 305 (1976). 
 31 Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 520 (1990). 
 32  See Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier Kraakman, Reinventing the Outside Director: An Agenda for 
Institutional Investors, 43 Stan. L. Rev. 863 (1991). 
 33 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor Voice, 39 
UCLA L. Rev. 811 (1992); Edward B. Rock, The Logic and (Uncertain) Significance of Institutional 
Shareholder Activism, 79 Geo. L.J. 445 (1991); John C. Coffee, Jr., Liquidity Versus Control: The 
Institutional Investor as Corporate Monitor, 91 Colum. L. Rev. 1277 (1991). 
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the $30+ trillion in total market capitalization.34 Among these are mutual funds, pension funds, 
and insurance companies together commanding a decisive majority (respectively, $9.1 trillion, 
$2.3 trillion, and $811 billion). They present the old problems of agency costs in new ways due to 
three critical changes in the institutional investor landscape that have occurred in the past two 
decades.  
 Foremost, a large and growing percentage of shares are held by indexers. Indexing involves 
buying proportional stakes in every stock listed in some benchmark index, such as the S&P 500 or 
Russell 3000, without doing any research or being exposed to anything but the market risk-return.  
Popularized by the late Jack Bogle, indexing was a marginal practice through the 1990s, but today 
is a familiar approach. Bogle’s company, Vanguard, is a household name. Large indexers 
command trillions of assets, representing one-quarter to one-third or more of total U.S. public 
company equity. In 1997, less than 8% of mutual funds were indexed, whereas today more than 
40% are.   
 Second is the substantial shortening of average holding periods, indicative of increased 
trading for arbitrage, momentum strategies, and other short-term drivers. The best-selling financial 
author, Michael Lewis, dramatized the stakes in his 2014 book, Flash Boys, and the pace of 
acceleration continues with sustained technological advances in computing algorithms, artificial 
intelligence and machine learning.35 Average holding periods shortened significantly from the 
mid-1960s through the early- or mid- 2000s;36 while the average has held steady since, this appears 
to be due to how the shorter horizons of many are offset by the more permanent holdings of the 
indexers.37  
 Third is the rise of activism. Shareholder gadflies have roamed corporate America since 
the Gilbert brothers popularized the practice in the 1950s.38 And from the 1970s through the 1990s, 
incumbent managers faced constant threats to corporate control from rival firms, takeover artists, 
and colorful raiders such as Carl Icahn and Nelson Peltz.39 But it is only in the past two decades 
that a vast pool of capital developed among specialty firms, dubbed shareholder activists, dedicated 
to the practice and featuring a well-developed playbook, a cadre of professional advisers, and 
repeat players such as Bill Ackman, Dan Loeb and Paul Singer.40 
 
 34 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial Accounts of the United States: 
Historical Annual Tables (2005-2015); Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Financial 
Accounts of the United States, Second Quarter 2018 at 130. 
 35 See Tom C. W. Lin, Artificial Intelligence, Finance, and the Law, 88 Fordham L. Rev. 531 
(2019).  
 36 Anne M. Tucker, The Long and The Short: Portfolio Turnover Ratios & Mutual Fund Investment 
Time Horizons, 43 Iowa J. Corp. L. 581 (2018) (through 2000); Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at 992 
(through 2007). 
 37 K.J. Martijn Cremers & Simone M. Sepe, Institutional Investors, Corporate Governance, and 
Firm Value, 41 Seattle U. L. Rev. 387, at n. 42 (2018) [hereinafter Cremers & Sepe, Institutional Investors]. 
 38 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Annual Shareholder Meetings: From Populist 
to Virtual, Financial History (Fall 2018)  
 39 See Knights, Raiders and Targets (J. Coffee, L. Lowenstein & S. Rose-Ackerman eds. 1988).  
 40 See William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Introduction to Institutional Investor Activism: 
Hedge Funds and Private Equity, Economics and Regulation 1-38 (2015). 
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 Facing these forces, it has been easy to overlook the enduring power of the traditional 
cohort of individual and institutional investors who prefer old-fashioned techniques famously 
known as buy-and-hold. The style is epitomized by Warren Buffett and Berkshire Hathaway and 
boasts such notable historical figures as John Maynard Keynes and Benjamin Graham, along with 
such legacy names as John Neff of Wellington Management or Thomas Rowe Price and his 
eponymous firm, T. Rowe Price Group Inc.41 
B. Classification  
 Today’s diverse shareholder base can be classified in a variety of ways. Examples include 
formal, functional or behavioral. Which approach is appropriate depends on the purpose of the 
classification, such as the viewpoint of potential customers, regulators, or researchers.  
 An obvious formal starting point distinguishes individuals from institutions, which is both 
straightforward and useful.  This delineation is useful for fundamental issues such as the role of 
government. For example, a government agency might plausibly be charged with developing 
educational programs for individuals but not institutions and likewise be asked to provide oversight 
for institutional investors but not individuals.42 
 A classic formal delineation of institutional investors considers legal form of organization. 
Examples: banks, hedge funds, index funds, investment advisors, insurance companies, and mutual 
funds.43 Such a scheme is useful for many purposes, such as determining beneficiaries and 
fiduciary duties, regulatory restrictions and competitive pressures.44  
 In more functional terms, investment strategy is a way to sort institutional investors, such 
as technical versus fundamental, growth versus value, or quantitative versus qualitative.45 Those 
alternatives would be of special interest when investigating relative investment appeal, such as 
risk-adjusted returns or volatility.46  
 Another functional approach would examine trading behavior. For instance, how different 
shareholders use information may be important when studying market efficiency47 or formulating 
 
 41 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8. 
 42 Donald C. Langevoort, The SEC, Retail Investors, and the Institutionalization of the Securities 
Markets, 95 Va. L. Rev. 1025 (2009). 
 43 See Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at 992. Institutions cater to different clienteles, such as 
consumers, retirees, labor union members or high net worth individuals.  
 44 Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9. 
 45 Institutional investors follow a variety of different investment strategies (such as value, growth 
or income) or different target size (such as small or large cap). Some funds combine these features, 
classifying as large value, large growth, small value, or small growth. They may rivet on particular sectors 
or geographic regions or attempt to buy small stakes in essentially every company in the stock market. 
 46 Some have objectives in addition to traditional shareholder returns, such as promoting the 
interests of labor See David Webber, The Rise of the Working-Class Shareholder: Labor’s Last Best 
Weapon (2018); Ashwini K. Agrawal, Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: 
Evidence from Proxy Voting, 25 Rev. Fin. Stud. 187 (2012); Roberta Romano, Public Pension Fund 
Activism in Corporate Governance Reconsidered, 93 Colum. L. Rev. 795 (1993). 
 47 See Sanford J. Grossman & Joseph E. Stiglitz, On the Impossibility of Informationally Efficient 
Markets, 70 Am. Econ. Rev. 393 (1980). 
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securities regulations.48 Helpful categories include: insiders, market makers, noise traders, 
liquidity traders, and information traders.49 These groups differ in terms of their access to and use 
of information, with significant effects on market performance and optimal disclosure laws.50  
 A behavior-based classification of investors might incorporate such varying approaches to 
handling information. The behavioral division might also consider the central questions in the 
corporate law debates over time horizons and conviction levels.  
  In the early 1990s, for example, Harvard Business School Professor Michael Porter 
compared institutional investor behavior in the U.S. with counterparts in Germany and Japan, 
whose economies were operating more productively.51 He reported a U.S. propensity toward either 
indexing or trading compared to the more concentrated and patient investor model prevalent 
abroad.  
 In the late 1990s, University of Pennsylvania Wharton Business School Professor Brian 
Bushee extended Porter’s analysis.52 Bushee noted that Porter’s critique overlooked the significant 
group of U.S. investors who both concentrate and hold—a blind spot that persists in the corporate 
law literature.53 But he stressed that Porter’s insight warranted focusing on differences among 
shareholders represented by two variables: time horizon and conviction.54 Bushee identified three 
categories of institutional investors as follows:  
 “transient” institutions, which exhibit high portfolio turnover and own small 
stakes in portfolio companies;  
“dedicated” institutions, which provide stable ownership and take large 
positions in individual firms; and  
“quasi-indexers,” which also trade infrequently but own small stakes (similar to 
an index strategy).55 
 Bushee’s empirical work was straightforward. He computed various measures of horizon 
and conviction: horizon by quarterly portfolio turnover as well as portion held more than two years 
and conviction by average percentage ownership of investees, the percentage of investees 
 
 48 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities Regulation, 55 
Duke L.J. 711, 722 (2006).   
 49 See Paul Rose & Bernard S. Sharfman, Shareholder Activism as a Corrective Mechanism in 
Corporate Governance, 2014 BYU L. Rev. 1015, 1023-24. 
 50  Insiders have company information but securities laws limit their right to use it; market makers 
may have the information but their trades support balancing supply and demand; noise traders chase fads; 
liquidity traders act for nonfundamental reasons, such as funding needs or calibrating to an index; and 
information traders do the heavy lifting of digesting and acting on information. See id. 
51 Michael Porter, Capital Choices: Changing the Way America Invests in Industry, 5 J. App. Corp. 
Fin. (1992).  
 52  Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29.  
 53 See infra Parts II & III. 
 54 Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29-30 (using the words stability and stakes rather 
than horizon or conviction but synonymously).  
 55 Id. Shareholder activists are introduced into this schematic below, infra text accompanying note 
70. 
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representing at least a 5% share of the portfolio, and the average size of each investment.56  He 
then combined the horizon and conviction computations to capture the two factors together.   
 With that ranking, Bushee clustered the results into the three shareholder types and 
identified exemplars of each. Transients, with short time horizons and small stakes, are typified 
by Numeric, he said, a fund that specializes in exploiting dynamic stock market activity, not 
fundamental investment analysis of business; quasi-indexers, which buy small stakes in 500 to 
3000 stocks representing an entire market basket, is exemplified by CalPERS, Bushee wrote, the 
large California pension fund; and dedicated shareholders, those who buy large stakes and hold 
them for long periods, are epitomized by Warren Buffett’s Berkshire Hathaway, he said.57   
 Professor Bushee’s work has been widely influential. For example, decades after 
publication, consulting firm McKinsey & Company offered a similar take.58 It calls equivalent 
categories by different names: intrinsic instead of dedicated; mechanical instead of quasi-indexers; 
and traders instead of transients. But the analytical utility of the McKinsey and Bushee lexicons 
are the same and offer a valuable lens for purposes ranging from evaluating investor performance 
to expected handling of information and likelihood of different shareholder cohorts being informed 
participants in shareholder voting.  
 In finance scholarship, numerous empirical studies develop tests to identify shareholders 
who rank high by combined horizon duration and portfolio concentration. For instance, University 
of Connecticut finance professor Paul Borochin, and researcher Jie Yang, developed such a 
database to determine the effects of shareholder base on a company’s governance structure and 
economic value.59 Finance professors Martjin Cremers  of Notre Dame University and Ankur 
Pareek of University of Nevada created a large data set of all institutional investors dating to 1980, 
presenting, quarter-by-quarter, each shareholder’s concentration and average holding period.60 The 
scholars have been using this data to conduct a variety of tests concerning relative investor 
performance.61 
 In legal scholarship, Professor Belinfanti, in her research on how companies can shape 
their shareholder base, canvassed multiple alternative methods of classifying investors.62 
Belinfanti features Professor Bushee’s method prominently, describing it as a “contemporary” 
 
 56 Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 29-30. 
 57 Id.  
 58 Robert N. Palter et al., Communicating with The “Right” Investors, in McKinsey on Finance: 
The Enduring Value of Fundamentals, 40 McKinsey & Co. 57, 58-59 (2011). 
 59 Paul Borochin & Jie Yang The Effects of Institutional Investor Objectives on Firm Valuation 
and Governance, 126 J. Fin. Econ. 171 (2017) (including a robust propensity score model for identify 
quality shareholders, dubbed DED for dedicated, after Bushee, in the model).  
 60 Martjin Cremers & Ankur Pareek, Patient Capital Outperformance: The Investment Skill of High 
Active Share Managers Who Trade Infrequently, 122 J. Fin. Econ. 288 (2016). (concept of “active share” 
measures relative concentration of a portfolio compared to a benchmark index, with a pure index active 
share equal to zero and a completely concentrated portfolio equal to one). 
 61The data and related research are posted on the Notre Dame University web site. 
https://activeshare.nd.edu/academic-research/.   
62 Tamara C. Belinfanti, Shareholder Cultivation and New Governance, 38 Del. J. Corp. L. 789, 
818 (2014).  
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method to “drill down” beyond conventional classifications to focus on important behaviors and 
propensities.63    
 Professors Dallas and Barry use Bushee’s classification system in their empirical work on 
shareholder voting regimes.64 They too note alternative approaches to classifying investors, such 
as formal categories like type of business organization.65 But for purposes of corporate law, they 
stressed that what matters most is behavior, particularly time horizons and conviction levels.66 
Dallas and Barry summarize the implications of Bushee’s classification scheme for this purpose 
as follows:67 
 Transient shareholders . . . have the least incentive to “understand drivers 
of long-run value.” 
 Dedicated investors . . . have the greatest incentive to think about the long 
term and to take an active role in corporate governance and monitoring of portfolio 
companies. . . .  
 Quasi-indexers fall between the other two categories. They . . . have good 
incentives to think about the company's long-term value, but do not have good 
incentives to be involved in corporate governance and oversight.   
 Since Bushee developed his classification system in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the 
activist shareholder segment developed into a distinctive cohort.68 Within Bushee’s system, they 
might be classified as transients if they held for short periods and in low concentrations. But most 
are highly concentrated in their positions, and sometimes even hold for above-average periods, 
though their time horizon is routinely portrayed in the literature as short-term.69 
 Given that shareholder activists adopt a unique approach to engagement,70 by public 
campaigns for corporate change, separately classifying this cohort is analytically useful. The 
scholarship in the corporate horizon debate provides behavioral profiles of activists, transients and 
indexers, to be reviewed in Parts II and III. It has not developed a behavioral profile of the quality 
shareholder, though this cohort features in other strands of corporate law scholarship. Accordingly, 
this Part will continue by presenting such a profile.  
 
 63 Id. 
64 Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 549 n.6 (2016). Part IV of this Article addresses the literature on 
shareholder voting regimes and normative implications of this Article’s analysis.  
 65  Id. at n.270. 
 66 Behavior changes over time. For example, Bushee estimates that about 1/5 of institutional 
investors change their Bushee classification over a three-year period. See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 
n. 116 (citing correspondence between Bushee and Dallas).   
 67 Dallas &. Barry, supra note 9, at 625-627 (citations omitted). 
 68 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40. 
 69 See Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate 
Control, 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021, 1083 (2007) (“Hedge funds come close to being the archetypal short-
term investor”); John C. Coffee, Jr. & Darius Palia, The Wolf at the Door: The Impact of Hedge Fund 
Activism on Corporate Governance, 41 Iowa J. Corp. L. 545, 573-574 (2016) (observing that hedge funds 
might be “archetypical” short-term shareholder but noting that many mutual funds are too). 
 70 See Bratton & McCahery, supra note 40. 
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C. Behavior 
 Professor Bushee named Buffett as exemplifying the “dedicated” or quality shareholder.71 
Other empirical research identifying quality shareholders invariably place Buffett and Berkshire 
Hathaway at or near the top.72  Many other corporate law scholars have echoed the point, including 
Professor Dallas in her use of the Bushee model in her empirical work.73 Professors Choi and 
Pritchard, in their discussion of the various behaviors that diverse shareholders exhibit, suggested 
that Buffett is the “paradigm” of such an approach.74 Buffett’s standing as a model of the patient 
committed shareholder has been particularly common among scholars of trust law, where 
investment theory plays a central role.75  
 Based on my extensive research and writings with and about Buffett over the past three 
decades, I concur in the conclusion and can explain the behavior.76 First, while Bushee’s reference 
was to Buffett as a shareholder, it is equally true that Buffett, as CEO of Berkshire Hathaway, 
consciously cultivated such a cohort among its shareholders.77 He began doing so two decades 
before Bushee minted his classification, when Buffett referred to Bushee’s cohort of “dedicated” 
shareholders as “quality” shareholders.78 Since this is also an adjective often used by corporate 
scholars to designate a variety of shareholder behaviors, it is the term this Article will use.79  
 
 71 Bushee, The “Right” Investors, supra note 9, at 30-31. 
 72 E.g., Borochin & Yang, supra note 59;  Cremers & Pareek, supra note 60; Cunningham, Quality 
Shareholders, supra note 8, Appendix. 
 73  Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 625-627.  
 74  Stephen J. Choi & A.C. Pritchard, Behavioral Economics and the SEC, 56 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 15 n. 
65 (2003). 
 75 E.g., Jeffrey A. Cooper, Empty Promises: Settlor’s Intent, The Uniform Trust Code and the 
Future of Trust Investment Law, 88 B.U. L. Rev. 1165, 1190-1195 (2008) (sharply contrasting Buffett with 
indexers as well as transients, drawing on prominent detailed accounts of Buffett’s philosophy, including 
my work); see also Stewart E. Sterk, Rethinking Trust Law Reform: How Prudent is Modern Prudent 
Investor Doctrine?, 95 Cornell L. Rev. 851, 873-874 (2010) (noting my views on Buffett). 
 76  See supra note 17. 
 77 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 185-188. 
 78 See Edward B. Rock, Shareholder Eugenics in the Public Corporation, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 849, 
879 (2012) (quoting Buffett’s description of Berkshire’s goal and strategy to attract “high quality 
shareholders”); Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 185-188 (“attracting quality 
shareholders”). 
 79 E.g., Cynthia A. Williams & John M. Conley, An Emerging Third Way? The Erosion of the 
Anglo-American Shareholder Value Construct, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 493,519 (2005) (quoting a U.K. 
government official as favoring “high quality shareholder engagements”); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch, 
Marcel Kahan & Edward B. Rock, Does Majority Voting Improve Board Accountability?  83 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 1119, 1164 n. 114 (2016) (referring to shareholder proposals as being of “higher- or lower- quality”); 
Ronald J. Gilson & Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Agency Costs of Activism, 113 Colum. L. Rev. 863, 913 (2013) 
(referring to the relative quality of shareholder activist proposals). 
 The term should be compared with that of quality investing, referring to an investment strategy 
seeking to find high-quality businesses that may be purchased at a reasonable price. See infra note 88. 
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 While Buffett is certainly an exemplar, he is part of a long tradition extending back many 
decades, and will leave a legacy of legions of followers in his wake. As for predecessors, consider 
John Maynard Keynes, the distinguished economist, scholar and investor. Keynes stated his 
philosophy, based on years of experience and reflection: “I get more and more convinced that the 
right method in investments is to put fairly large sums” in select enterprises and that it is “a mistake 
to think that one limits one’s risk by spreading too much between [diverse] enterprises.”80 Rather, 
Keynes avowed: “I believe now that successful investment depends on . . . a steadfast holding . . . 
in fairly large units through thick and thin, perhaps for several years. . . .”81  
 Professor Amy Westbrook noted Keynes’ influence on Buffett in her portrait of their style, 
stressing patience and conviction as defining features.82  On concentration, she notes that 
diversification is “close to godliness” on Wall Street, but that Buffett holds the opposite 
conviction.83 On the long-term view, Westbrook explains how Buffett consciously cultivated 
fellow shareholders with such a view because it was so important to his own approach. She 
explained: “In a world in which investors are told that seconds matter and trading is easy, he 
advocates buying Berkshire stock and then not touching it again.”84 
 Another Buffett predecessor was Benjamin Graham, his professor at Columbia University 
and a renowned investor and educator.85 Graham taught Buffett—and two generations of 
followers—the art of value investing.86 This involves conducting fundamental analysis of 
businesses to estimate their value and then buying only the small number that can be obtained at a 
price substantially below estimated value.87 A modern variation on Graham’s technique is called 
quality investing, or growth investing, which expands the pool to include buying stocks at a price 
that is low in relation to reasonably anticipated growth in intrinsic value.88 
 
 80 John F. Wasik, Keynes’s Way to Wealth: Timeless Investment Principles from the Great 
Economist (McGraw Hill 2014).  
 81 David Chambers, Elroy Dimson & Justin Foo, Keynes the Stock Market Investor: A Quantitative 
Analysis, 50 J. Fin. Quant. Analy. 843 (2015). Keynes managed investments for Cambridge University’s 
King’s College from 1927 to 1945. He concentrated as much as half the portfolio in five companies, and 
held them at least five years apiece. See Allen C. Benello, Michael Van Biema & Tobias E. Carlisle, 
Concentrated Investing (2017), at 48, 51. Despite working in a challenging era that included the Great 
Depression and World War II, returns were impressive: a compound annual growth rate of 9.12% in contrast 
to the broad U.K. market return of negative 0.89%. Id. at 58.   
 82 Amy Deen Westbrook, Warren Buffett’s Corporation: Reconnecting Owners and Managers, 34 
Okla. City U. L. Rev. 515, 544-545 (2009). 
 83 Id. 
 84 Id. at 535. 
 85 See Benjamin Graham, The Intelligent Investor (1959); Benjamin Graham & David Dodd, 
Security Analysis (1962). 
 86 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, How to Think Like Benjamin Graham and Invest Like Warren 
Buffett (2001); Warren Buffett, The Superinvestors of Graham and Doddsville, Hermes (1985). 
 87 Bruce N. Greenwald, et al., Value Investing: From Graham to Buffett and Beyond (2001). 
 88 See Cornelius C. Bond, T. Rowe Price: The Man, The Company, and The Investment Philosophy 
(2019); Lawrence A. Cunningham, Torkell T. Eide & Patrick Hargreaves, Quality Investing (2016); 
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 Professor Lowenstein distilled the Buffett/Graham approach in his corporate law 
scholarship.89 Lowenstein stressed that this approach to investing is based on fundamental business 
analysis—neither indexing nor trading. The principal criteria are: conviction, by holding fewer 
than 20 stocks, and patience, by holding stocks for an average of at least two years.90 
 Quality shareholders adopt a wide variety of diverse strategies for buying, holding or 
selling, and engaging with management. Buying may be made in accordance with the tenets of 
Graham’s pure value investing, the growth investing extension, or some other variant.91 In all 
cases, however, the investment decision is based upon fundamental business analysis—neither 
trading activity nor indexing.92 Concentration is invariably the result.93 
 Likewise, quality shareholders may adopt different policies concerning whether and when 
to sell shares. Although most usually follow Buffett to prefer permanent holding periods,94 some 
may sell when price rises to a significant multiple of value.95  
 Finally, quality shareholders have varying propensities concerning engagement, though 
their tendency is monitoring at a distance and consulting when asked.96 Buffett is again seen to 
exemplify this stance.  Professors Bratton and McCarey put it this way:  
The model block owner is the legendary Warren Buffett, a fundamental value 
investor who takes large, under-diversified, long-term positions; monitors 
carefully; but does not attempt to interfere with the formulation or implementation 
of the business plan, except in a crisis.97 
 Manifestations of Buffett’s approach include Berkshire’s large long-term stakes in a 
relatively small number of companies. Exquisite examples of stakes still held today are 17.9% of 
American Express, initially acquired in 1962; 9.4% of Coca-Cola, initially acquired in 1984; and 
9.8% of Wells Fargo, initially acquired in 1989.98 All of these companies have faced business 
 
Clifford S. Asness, Quality Minus Junk, 24 Rev. Acc. Stud. 34 (2019); Robert Novy-Marx, Quality 
Investing (2014), https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/9480/0c35aff62f304d42ac8a9112cd9f40d8e59f.pdf.  
 89 Louis Lowenstein, Searching for Rational Investors In a Perfect Storm, 30 J. Corp. L. 539, 547 
(2005). Professor Lowenstein was a close personal friend of Warren Buffett and long-time investor in 
Berkshire Hathaway. His son, Roger, a prominent journalist and author, wrote the classic biography, 
Warren Buffett: The Making of An American Capitalist.  
 90 Lowenstein, Searching, supra note 89, at 547. 
 91 See John Train, Money Masters of Our Time (2000), p. 306. 
 92 Robert G. Hagstrom, The Warren Buffett Portfolio: Mastering the Power of the Focus Investment 
Strategy 31 (1999). 
 93 See Allen C. Benello, Michael Van Biema & Tobias E. Carlisle, Concentrated Investing (2017). 
 94 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17. 
 95 E.g., John Neff, On Investing (1999) 116-117 (Neff, a quality shareholder, explaining that “you 
don’t have to buy and hold forever”). 
 96 See Robert P. Miles, Warren Buffett Wealth: Principles and Practical Methods Used by the 
World’s Greatest Investor 33-34 (2004). 
 97   William W. Bratton & Joseph A. McCahery, Regulatory Competition, Regulatory Capture, and 
Corporate Self-regulation, 73 N.C. L. Rev. 1861, 1919, n. 224 (1995).  
 98 Berkshire Hathaway Inc. Annual Report (2019). 
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challenges during Berkshire’s ownership and Buffett has helped behind the scenes, but never 
interfered publicly.99  
 Concerning conviction, quality shareholders view themselves as part owners of a business. 
Such an ownership sense requires conviction, reflected in thorough research and disciplined 
decisions. As put by the venerable firm of Ruane Cunniff, founded by another Graham student and 
Buffett classmate, William Ruane: “We take pride and pleasure in investigating a company from 
all angles, doing the kind of on-the-ground, primary research that an enterprising journalist might 
do.”100 Quality shareholders concentrate, often limiting their portfolios to some 20 companies.101 
 Concerning time horizon, quality shareholders are fond of following Buffett in saying their 
favorite holding period is forever.102 They are not motivated to beat the market in any given year 
but to generate returns over long periods of time. Since quality shareholders are generally risk 
averse, sustained patience reduces both reinvestment risk and expense risk.103 Owning outstanding 
companies for very long periods not only limits risk but reaps the benefits of compounding, a 
cherished principle of quality shareholders.104 
 Quality shareholders reject the prevailing fashion of comparing their annual return with 
some benchmark index.105 They eschew reference to the relative volatility of the indexes.106 
 
 99 See Lawrence A. Cunningham & Stephanie Cuba, Margin of Trust 78 (2019). In 2014 a 
shareholder activist launched a public campaign challenging Coca-Cola’s executive compensation plan and 
urged Berkshire to support it. Instead, Buffett privately engaged outside of the spotlight to resolve the issue.  
In 2016 concerning American Express, Buffett declined an overture from a shareholder activist seeking 
change, favoring direct consultation with long-time chief executive officer.   
 100 Ruane Cuniff website. 
 101 E.g., Ruane Cunniff & Goldfarb: “Our small collection of investments bears little resemblance 
to the S&P 500 or any other index. In fact, our top ten investments often account for >60% of the value of 
our portfolios. The S&P 500 may be relevant for assessing our performance over the long term, but it has 
no bearing on how we construct our portfolios.” 
 Southeastern Asset Management: “We are long-term owners, not traders or speculators, and invest 
for the long-term based on objective intrinsic values with a horizon of at least five years.  We construct our 
portfolios with what we believe to be our best 18-22 global investment ideas. Concentrating allows for 
adequate diversification while providing some of the best opportunities to maximize returns, and minimize 
loss of principal.” 
 102 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17. 
 103 On reinvestment risk, selling shares results in capital needing to be reinvested and finding new 
outstanding investments is time-consuming and difficult. On expense risk, trading and taxes are immediate 
costs of selling, disguising the stated nominal returns that draw attention. 
 104 See Warren Buffett, The Joys of Compounding (1963). 
 105 E.g., FundSmith: “Over a sufficient period of time, you will no doubt want to assess our 
performance against a range of benchmarks – the performance of cash, bonds, equities and other funds, and 
we will assist you in that process by providing comparisons. However, we do not think it is helpful to make 
comparisons with movements in other asset prices or indices over the short term, as we are not trying to 
provide short term performance.” 
 106 E.g., Cedar Rock Capital Partners: “We make no effort to minimize volatility relative to any 
national, regional or global index of equity market performance. However, we expect our emphasis on both 
quality and value to generate satisfactory absolute and relative performance over the long term.” 
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Quality shareholders object to the common habit of distinguishing between passive index funds 
on one hand and all others, dubbed “active,” on the other.107 They invest for, and measure 
performance, over many years, not annually as is the obsession of many commentators.108  
  The philosophy of quality shareholders can be further illuminated by contrasting it with 
that of indexers.  Indexers believe in efficient markets: that share prices reflect future prospects. 
Quality shareholders doubt that numbers capture all, whether computed by humans, powerful 
computers, or elaborate algorithms. Quality shareholders conduct the fundamental analysis that is 
necessary in order to promote stock market efficiency. In their view, passive funds free ride off of 
that work.109  
 The Keynes-Graham-Buffett model continues to attract a large following of quality 
shareholders. Many are powerful names recognized in the institutional investor world. To 
illustrate, the following lists top quality shareholders as identified by Professors Borochin and 
Yang:110 
  
Top Quality 
Berkshire Hathaway 
Capital Research & Management 
Fidelity Management & Research  
 
 107  E.g., Baillee Gifford: 
 We are not passive investors who think that current share prices capture the future prospects 
of companies. We don’t believe that investment decisions can be made on numbers alone, even 
by supercomputers and complex algorithms. Passive has its place, providing low-cost market 
access with, on average, better after-fees results than active managers. However, it has little to do 
with the process of allocating capital to innovative companies—though on that point it has much 
in common with many active managers. 
 We are not a typical active manager either: we believe this term has become a one-size-fits-
all description which is very unhelpful for investors. It has been hijacked by many fund managers 
who think it suggests ‘activity’ and simply being different from an index. The reality is that much 
of this activity has more to do with trying to outsmart other investors than with the creative 
deployment of capital, and that defining active as being different from an index is to start in the 
wrong place. This is why most active investors fail to deliver returns that outperform passive 
investment strategies over the long term. They’re not even trying to do the fundamental job of 
investing. 
 108 Gardner Russo Gardner:  
 [Portfolio concentration] may mean temporary depression of market values for companies if 
and when they are out of favor. However, reduced share prices as a result of market sentiment do 
not necessarily relate to reduced prospects for our companies’ operations. Accordingly, we prefer 
not to move from sector to sector, following the bubble of the moment. Rather, we prefer to 
patiently await the market’s return to recognition of our businesses’ intrinsic value. [T]his may 
mean that our portfolios undergo periodic under-performance versus the market as a whole. . . . 
Because our core positions can be heavily weighted, performance of our portfolios can be 
dampened by market sentiment, which we regard, however, as immaterial to our investments’ 
long-term potential.  
 109 See Howard Marks, Investing Without People (2018).  
 110 Borochin & Yang, supra note 59. 
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Harris Associates (Oakmark Funds) 
State Farm Insurance 
Southeastern Asset Management 
Wellington Management 
  
 Like Berkshire, these quality shareholders have large parts of their portfolios invested in 
sizable stakes of major companies held for many years. Examples: Capital Research in Abbott 
Labs; Fidelity in SalesForce; Harris in Tenet Health; State Farm in Air Products; Southeastern in 
Graham Holdings; and Wellington in Marsh & McLennan and PNC Financial.111 Other examples 
of such quality shareholders and stakes are the positions of Franklin Resources in Roper and 
Massachusetts Financial in Accenture.112  
 Despite convictions, quality shareholders face relentless competitive pressures. 
D. Competition and Performance 
 Today’s institutional investors face pressure to favor indexing or transience. Compensation 
of fund managers is often based on annual returns, so the question becomes whether an investor 
beat the market for a given year or not. In such an environment, pressure is substantial to diversify 
widely on the one hand and, on the other, to chase returns by rapid trading. While quality 
shareholders reject and resist such approaches, the result is a rising portion of indexers and 
transients compared to quality shareholders. 
 The effects of this intensive environment are reflected in estimates of the relative size of 
these cohorts. The number of different indexes has proliferated—at least 60 major ones by one 
count, with Morningstar alone designating at least 300 different indexes.113 Self-described index 
funds easily manage at least 20% of total market capitalization, a figure that rises to as much as 
40% if counting funds that hug indexes without describing themselves as index funds.114 
 
 111 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8. 
 112 Id. 
113 Families of benchmarks propagate multiple indexes, now numbering as many as 60. These 
include Dow Jones (at least 6:  DJ Industrial Average, DJ US Select Dividend, DJ Wilshire 4500 and DJ 
Wilshire 5000); FTSE (4: FTSE High Dividend Yield, FTSE RAFI US 100 and Mid Small 1500); 
NASDAQ (2: NASDAQ 100 and the NASDAQ Composite); and Schwab (2, including the Schwab 1000 
and Schwab Small Cap. Dozens more are offered by several behemoths delineating among small, mid and 
large cap plus their value and growth components: MSCI (15 different ones), S&P (14) and Russell (13). 
114  Recently, total market cap of the Russell 3000 was about $30 trillion. Of that, operators of the 
largest passive indexers commanded nearly half at around $14 trillion (though some run stock-picking funds 
too).  Pension funds as a group held about 1/3 or $9 trillion, much prone to quasi-indexing, though some to 
dedication. Activist hedge funds own a sliver—around $100 billion or 1%—though they back that capital 
with powerful game-changing strategies for companies. Given the high level of aggregate share turnover—
average holding periods barely near one year—many on the typical shareholder list don’t stay a long time, 
making for a sizable portion of transients.  
More specifically, five of the largest activist hedge funds command in aggregate perhaps $100 
billion (Ichan, Third Point, ValueAct, Pershing, Trian) whereas the largest four financial institutions 
manage $14 trillion (BlackRock, State Street, Vanguard and Fidelity). Among pension funds, the five 
largest together run nearly $1 trillion (CalPERs, CALSTRs, STRS Ohio). The quality investing cohort 
represents the rest. Yet the power of even such relatively small stakes is immense. For perspective, the 
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 Transient holders are numerous, reflected in high share turnover. In the past two decades, 
average holding periods for hedge funds have fallen to under one year and for mutual funds under 
two.115 In recent years, overall average time horizons have remained unchanged, though this is 
likely due to the rise of indexers, which trade infrequently, offset by the rise in transients, which 
trade often.116 Together, this transient cohort represents perhaps as much as 40% of total market 
capitalization as well.117  
 At the other extreme, activists in aggregate command relatively small stakes, not likely 
more than 5% of all, though they strategically leverage their power during campaigns. Quality 
shareholders make up the rest.118 While small overall—perhaps 15% of all equity—this cohort can 
be mobilized for amplified influence, sometimes playing important roles in corporate power 
struggles.119 
 What leads a particular investor, or institution, to adopt one investment strategy or another 
is partly a function of personality and partly of expected returns.120 For nearly two decades, debate 
has raged around whether stock indexing or stock picking is a superior strategy, often delineating 
further into types of broad indexes (by size, sector, or geography) with stock pickers competing 
against that benchmark.121 Debate dates to a 1997 article by Mark Carhart, then a professor of 
finance at the University of Southern California, finding no evidence of successful mutual fund 
stock pickers.122  
 Ensuing research contributed to what became conventional wisdom, such as: average 
active funds underperform the market after fees;123 top fund performance doesn’t persist;124 and, 
while some managers are skilled, few deliver on that value for customers after fees.125 Yet debate 
 
largest listed companies now boast market caps around $1 trillion and many smaller ones around $4 to $10 
billion.  
 115 See supra note 36 (citing sources). 
 116 See supra text accompanying note 37. 
117  See supra note 114.  
118  See supra note 114.  
 119 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 (chapter 2) (giving examples of quality 
shareholders’ roles in activist campaigns concerning Pernod Ricard, Ashland Global Holdings, and United 
Technologies). 
 120 See Henrik Cronqvista, Stephan Siegelb, & Frank Yua, Value Versus Growth Investing: Why 
Do Different Investors Have Different Styles?, 117 J. Fin. Econ. 333 (2015).   
 121 See Martijn Cremers, Jon Fulkerson & Timothy B. Riley, Challenging the Conventional 
Wisdom on Active Management: A Review of the Past 20 Years of Academic Literature on Actively 
Managed Mutual Funds, 75 Fin. Analysts J. 8 (2019). 
 122 Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. Fin. 57 (1997) (finding that 
the empirical evidence did “not support the existence of skilled or informed mutual fund portfolio 
managers”).  Michael Jensen conducted an earlier kindred study. Michael Jensen, The Performance of 
Mutual Funds in the Period 1945-1964, 23 J. Fin. 389 (1968). 
 123 William Sharpe, The Arithmetic of Active Management, 47 Fin. Analysts J. 7 (1991). 
 124 Mark Carhart, On Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 52 J. Fin. 57 (1997). 
 125 Eugene Fama & Kenneth French, Luck Versus Skill in the Cross-Section of Mutual Fund 
Performance, 65 J. Fin. 915 (2010). 
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continues—and Buffett won a famous bet siding with indexers over hedge funds—at least those 
charging particularly high fees.126 Multiple editions of best-selling books continue to showcase 
dueling university professors: University of Pennsylvania finance professor Jeremy Siegel has 
repeatedly shown that buy-and-hold works,127 while Princeton University finance professor Burton 
Malkiel continues to release new editions of the book that legitimized indexing as a strategy.128  
  Changes in shareholder demographics during the past two decades, including increased 
competition and lower fees, has produced a new strand of research challenging these conventional 
views. For instance, there is evidence that the average active fund does outperform an equivalent 
index;129 some top-performance records do persist;130 and a sizable cohort of managers with 
particular traits demonstrate skill that covers their fees.131 Among those traits are conviction and 
patience, the defining traits of quality shareholders.   
 
E. Advantages 
  Each shareholder segment adds unique value: activists promote management 
accountability; index funds enable millions to enjoy market returns at low cost; and traders offer 
liquidity.   
 With such advantages, however, come disadvantages: activists becoming overzealous; 
indexers lacking resources to understand specific company details; and traders inducing a short-
term focus. Quality shareholders balance the base, and counteract these downsides. 
 As to curbing overzealous activism, quality shareholders can be white squires—a term 
dating to the 1980s referring to block shareholders tending to support management.132 When a 
board perceives activist excess, it helps to have a few large long-term owners to consult. As a 
 
 126 In 2008, Buffett bet a hedge fund manager the S&P 500 would, over the ensuing ten years, 
outperform, after fees, any hedge fund portfolio the manager cared to assemble. See Buffett & Cunningham, 
The Essays, supra note  17, at 180-183. The manager assembled a fund of funds, a configuration charging 
multiple layers of high fees.  During the first three years, the S&P lagged the fund, but by bet’s end, the 
S&P won. If many took from the bet the lesson that indexers are always superior to non-indexed investing, 
that is a mistake. The primary point was to stress that ordinary individuals are almost certainly better off, 
given the risks and fees, of staking their savings in index funds rather than entrusting it to high-cost hedge 
funds. 
 127 See Jeremy J. Siegel, Stocks for the Long Run (5th ed. 2014); see also Louis Engel & Henry R. 
Hecht, How to Buy Stocks (8th ed. 1994). 
 128 See Burton G. Malkeil, A Random Walk Down Wall Street (12th ed. 2019). 
 129 Jonathan Berk & Jules van Binsbergen, Measuring Skill in the Mutual Fund Industry, 118 J. Fin. 
l Econ. (2015); Jonathan B. Berk & Jules H. van Binsbergen, Mutual Funds in Equilibrium, 9 Ann. Rev. 
Fin. Econ. 147 (2017); Hyunglae Jeon, Jangkoo Kang & Changjun Lee, Precision About Manager Skill, 
Mutual Fund Flows, and Performance Persistence, 40 N. Am. J. Econ. Fin. 222 (2017). 
 130 Nicolas Bollen & Jeffrey Busse, Short-term Persistence in Mutual Fund Performance, 18 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 569 (2005); Robert Kowoski, Allan Timmermann, Russ Wermers & Hal White, Can Mutual 
Fund “Stars” Really Pick Stocks? New Evidence from a Bootstrap Analysis, 61 J. Fin. 2551 (2006). 
 131 Yakov Amihud & Ruslan Goyenko, Mutual Fund’s R2 as Predictor of Performance, 26 Rev. 
Fin. Stud. 667 (2013); Martijn Cremers & Antti Petajisto, How Active is Your Fund Manager? A New 
Measure that Predicts Performance, 22 Rev. Fin. Stud. 3329 (2009). 
 132 See supra text accompanying note 119. 
22 
 
united front, the company’s hand is strengthened, resisting excess while addressing legitimate 
concerns activist may have.133    
 Quality shareholders study company specifics which indexers, being stretched thin, 
cannot.134 Indexers may be good at analyzing dynamic issues as they arise, but rarely develop deep 
knowledge that quality shareholders command.  Indexers invest most of their limited resources to 
develop views about what is best generally in corporate governance, not what is best for particular 
companies.  
 Quality shareholders differ from both activists and indexers regarding director elections. 
While activists often nominate directors fellow board members resist, and indexers almost never 
nominate directors at all, quality shareholders offer a supply of outstanding directors for their 
investees, often themselves.135  
 Being long-term, quality shareholders offset the short-term preferences of transients. A 
high density of quality shareholders, with their characteristic patience, helps managers operate 
strategically, with a long-term outlook.136 Such effects can percolate throughout a company. If less 
pressure comes from shareholders to produce short-term results, then directors, officers, 
employees, suppliers, strategic partners and others can operate in the same manner.137 
 Shareholder cohorts have different preferences about the price levels of stocks they own. 
Transients generally prefer the highest price possible for maximum profit on immediate sale; 
indexers favor the highest reasonable price because they assume, consistent with efficient market 
theory, that price and value are substantially the same; and quality shareholders, generally 
uninterested in an immediate sale and attune to stock market volatility, prefer a stock price that 
bears the most rational relationship possible to the company’s intrinsic business value.138 (At 
purchase, of course, quality shareholders seek prices below value.)139 
 Many managers tend to likewise prefer the highest possible stock price, perceiving it as a 
measure of their own performance, the higher the better.140 But while they often complain that 
their company’s stock price is too low, under- and over-pricing are equally likely and neither is 
 
 133 See James Woolery, Rob Leclerc & Richard Fields, The Ashland-Cruiser Proxy Contest—A 
Case Study, Harvard Governance Blog (Feb. 20, 2019). 
 134 See infra Part III for an extended discussion of the related debate.  
 135 See infra text accompanying notes 260-270; Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 
(Chapter 3) (examples from AutoNation, Berkshire Hathaway, Constellation Software, Credit Acceptance 
Corporation, Enstar, Fairfax Financial, Teledyne, The Washington Post Company).  
 136 See Brian L. Connelly, Laszlo Tihanyi, S. Trevis Certo & Michael A. Hitt, Marching to the Beat 
of Different Drummers: The Influence of Institutional Owners on Competitive Actions, 53 Acad. of Mgmt. 
Rev. (2010) (adapting Bushee’s empirical method and classification finding positive association between 
high density of quality shareholders and strategic management decision making). 
 137 Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 (chapter 3) (citing Leucadia Corporation and 
Markel Corporation).  
 138 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 38. 
 139 Graham, Intelligent Investor, supra note 85. 
 140 See Baruch Lev, Winning Investors Over: Surprising Truths About Honesty, Earnings Guidance, 
and Other Ways to Boost Your Stock Price 103-105 (2014). 
23 
 
desirable.141  
 A share price that is rationally related to business value can be a huge asset for several 
purposes, including making acquisitions, compensating employees, and facilitating fairly priced 
gains (or losses) when shareholders must sell.142 While there is a lively debate over the degree of 
such market efficiency—of how well price approximates value—companies with the closest 
nexus enjoy clear advantages over those with the widest gaps.  Evidence suggests that companies 
with ownership dominated by quality shareholders tend to enjoy stock prices that are less volatile 
and more rationally related to business value.143   
 With such advantages on offer, amid today’s fragmented shareholder base, the quality 
shareholder cohort remains a valuable force in the investment community and stock markets.  
 
II. TIME HORIZON  
 
 For decades, corporate law professors have debated shareholder time horizons. Critics 
focus on the short-termism of the shareholder activist. Defenders dispute the claim that short-
termism is a problem at all, let alone one exemplified by activists.    
 Amid the academic debate, considerable policy changes occurred in the broader process of 
legal and business evolution. These policy dynamics were so diverse—expanding shareholder 
power in some areas while curtailing it in others—that both sides of the academic debate could 
cite accomplishments but would also have to acknowledge setbacks.144 
 At present, therefore, the academic debate is at something of a stalemate. This Part reviews 
the academic theory and debate, along with the major policy implications, illustrating important 
 
 141 Id. 
 142 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note 17, at 38 (Berkshire’s owner-related business 
principles, number 14). 
 143 See Borochin & Yang, supra note 59.  Other recent research affirms other advantages that 
long-term investors contribute to companies they invest in.  Jarrad Hartford, Ambrus Kecksés & Sattar 
Mansi, Do Long-Term Investors Improve Corporate Decision Making? (2017) (SSRN 
abstract_id=2505261).   Longstanding empirical research has generally found that inclusion in an index 
drives stock price up. See Prem C. Jain, The Effect on Stock Price of Inclusion in or Exclusion from the 
S&P 500, Financial Analysts Journal, 43:1, 58-65 (1987), DOI: 10.2469/faj.v43.n1.58. Early evidence 
showed the increase ranged from 3 to 9%. Antti Petajisto, The Index Premium and Its Hidden Cost for 
Index Funds, 18 Journal of Empirical Finance 271, 272 (2011); Andrei Shleifer, Do Demand Curves for 
Stocks Slope Down?, 41 Journal of Finance 579, 584 (1986); William B. Elliott et al., What Drives the 
S&P 500 Inclusion Effect? An Analytical Survey, Financial Management (2006), at 31, 32.  This occurs as 
a result of supply and demand, as indexers buy the stock automatically. This drives price above value. 
Moreover, much of the evidence indicates that this price effect was not temporary. Although recent research 
suggests the effects have diminished over time and on more prominent indexes, Pyemo N. Afego, Effects 
of Changes in Stock Index Compositions: A Literature Survey, 52 International Financial Analysis 228, 
239 (2017), permanent market distortions remain a factor. See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kastiel, Corporate 
Governance and Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1229 (2018).   
 144 See infra text accompanying notes 170-172. 
24 
 
effects of adding quality shareholders on topics such as staggered boards and splitting versus 
combining the roles of board chairman and CEO.   
A. Theory and Debate   
 In traditional economic theory concerning stock market prices and managerial behavior, 
short-termism cannot exist.145 For one, competitive processes optimize any trade-off between 
short- and long-term values.146 In addition, efficient stock markets rapidly impound into price all 
relevant long-run information.147 At a minimum, current stock price is the best estimate of long-
term corporate value.148 Strategies that will deliver value tomorrow are manifest in stock price 
today.  
 A rival stance in economic theory contends that short-termism can arise from two sources: 
market myopia or managerial myopia. Market myopia occurs when investors fail to price shares 
correctly due to informational asymmetry between managers and investors. For example, 
managers may fear short-term market punishment for failure to meet quarterly earnings 
expectations, and therefore might forego costly research and development (“R&D”) in order to 
maintain current share price.149 
 Managerial myopia occurs when managers take opportunistic advantage of information 
asymmetries favoring them. A manger’s decision may yield rewards that are optimal for them—
without regard to time horizon—though impair long-term shareholder value. Examples are 
permanent boosts to a manager’s reputation or immediate bonuses from executing projects with 
inferior long-term corporate payoffs.150  
 The law and economics literature on short-termism adds another source: impatience. Some 
shareholders have immediate liquidity needs prompting them to sell.151 The effect is to rivet on 
prevailing price rather than longer-term value. Again, under efficient market theory, this cannot 
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occur, but under this rival theory such behavior can pressure managers to pursue short-term profits 
at the expense of long-term investment.152 
 Since such liquidity effects arise only for impatient investors, legal scholars wondered 
whether there are too many of them and what, if anything, corporate law might do about that. 
Critics targeted shareholder activists, especially hedge funds specializing in that approach. 
Opponents, while acknowledging some costs, stressed the gains in accountability and long-run 
prosperity.153 Shareholders are the best incentivized participants to assure managerial 
accountability, after all.154 Many are even better informed than corporate boards and therefore 
likely to be effective in overseeing wayward managers.155 They develop expertise in governance 
and strategy to provide superior solutions. 
 In the ensuing corporate law scholarship debate, contestants dispute the extent of the 
empirical evidence on short-termism. Prominent among the empirical researchers is the work of 
Professor Bushee—although not so much embracing his entire classification scheme as focusing 
on his related research on the effects of a high density of transients in a shareholder base.156 
 In an often-cited work,157 Bushee found that “transient ownership creates incentives for 
managers to sacrifice long-term investment to avoid a decline in current earnings.”158 He profiled 
all companies positioned to reverse a year-on-year earnings decline by reducing R&D spending. 
Companies with a high density of transients were significantly more likely to do so than those with 
lower transient populations.  
 Professors Coffee and Palia attest to the significance of Professor Bushese’s work and the 
long line of research that has followed and affirmed it. In their 2016 article on activism, for 
example, they introduce the line of scholarship to “strongly suggest” that shareholder base 
influences corporate time horizons.159 The authors note that Bushee’s research dates to 1998, and 
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highlight two major articles, finding that companies with high transient density are (1) more prone 
to earnings management such as R&D spending cuts and (2) more likely to be valued based on 
near-term earnings rather than long-term earnings.160 They reference further studies affirming the 
findings and adding that high transient density weakens shareholder oversight of managers and 
adds pressure for near-term earnings over long-term value.161 
 Other participants in the horizon debate start by citing Bushee’s work as evidence of short-
termisn, before moving on to argue broader normative implications. For instance, Professor Dallas 
challenges the shareholder value maximization norm because, per Bushee, short-term shareholders 
pressure managers for short term results with related evidence of earnings management.162 For 
another, Professor Millon, who elaborates on Bushee’s shareholder classification scheme more 
fully, finds compelling evidence of short-termism to demand that corporations take greater social 
responsibility.163  
 On the other side of the debate, many corporate law scholars find evidence of short-termism 
too limited to warrant substantial legal or policy changes. Professor Fried, for one, says “only a 
few” studies have found significant short-termism.164 Professors Bebchuk, Dent, and Roe all 
separately arrived at similar conclusions.165 Despite that point, Fried says there’s no question that 
short-term shareholder interests “are not perfectly aligned with [profit] maximization.”166 
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  If the empirical evidence is mixed,167 so are the realities: even if some activists have short-
term bias, they need support of a large bloc of other shareholders to influence corporate policy.168 
Importantly, that group would be comprised of a diverse group of shareholders, including 
transients, indexers and quality shareholders. Yet the literature in this debate tends to group all 
such others under the broad umbrella of “institutional investors.”169   
 Amid such disagreement on the facts as to short-termism, corporate law scholars have 
joined debate over the legal stakes. All participants agree that these are vast. At the most general 
level, they pose the hoary corporate law question of allocation of power between directors and 
officers on the one hand and shareholders on the other.170 Those who see short-termism as a serious 
problem look to weaken shareholder power and strengthen managerial power; opponents, viewing 
short-termism as at best an annoyance, worry about insulating managers from accountability.171  
 In play are all aspects of corporate governance, from proxy access and poison pills to voting 
rules. During the course of the horizon debate, proponents of shareholder empowerment won many 
victories, but so too did their opponents.172 Still up in the air are a variety of debated governance 
devices, such as staggered boards, chairman/CEO roles, and shareholder voting—all of which are 
considered later in this Article. These unresolved debates reflect how, to a significant degree, the 
horizon debate has reached a stalemate, as the next Section shows. Adding quality shareholders to 
the discussion could help unlock them, as the ensuing Section illustrates.  
 B. Status and Direction 
 For a snapshot of the current state of the horizon debate, consider the content of a major 
2018 symposium on the subject, which Professor Tucker hosted.173 It featured a dozen rich and 
original pieces, all making fascinating contributions, and sustaining attention on the relative virtues 
and differences in time horizon. Indeed, a few delineated time horizon more finely or sought to 
rephrase the horizon issue as whether a given time horizon accords with related risk assumed.174 
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Some prescribed sweeping systemic steps to counteract short-termism for social benefit through 
such innovations as federal savings accounts or universal equity funds175 or at the very least 
designing executive pay to reward long-term performance.176 
 In a more skeptical contribution to the symposium, Professor de Fontenay detected a 
tendency of debaters to imagine an ideal shareholder to measure others against.177 In the literature, 
the ideal is vaguely reported as a “long-term” and “active monitor” but without much detail, de 
Fontenay says, and for good reason, she adds: there is no such ideal. Rather, given both the 
diversity of shareholders and the dynamic rate of change in capital markets, lawyerly interventions 
to promote or retard particular shareholder types are doomed, she argues.  
 de Fontenay may be right, and the evidence in the horizon debate is mixed enough to 
warrant caution. But the literature’s nearly-exclusive emphasis on horizon obscures the element of 
relative concentration, whose inclusion might alter the case about whether there is such an ideal. 
At minimum, further delineation of shareholder types based on conviction would help move the 
debate forward.  
 Two empirical pieces in the symposium make such headway towards a more complete 
picture. In one, Professors Sampson and Shi drew upon Bushee’s classification, finding evidence 
that transients have a greater presence and quality shareholders (dedicated) a lesser presence over 
the period from 1980-2013.178 These observations take into account both time and conviction. 
While valuably delineating shareholder types, these scholars examined the implications for 
national economic performance rather than for corporate governance.    
 In their contribution to the symposium, Professor Cremers and Sepe explicitly add relative 
shareholder concentration to relative time horizons. They explain that accounts in the legal 
literature tend to present investors in “dichotomic” terms, as always short-term or always long-
term, while the truth is more complex, requiring “a more exact taxonomy of institutional investor 
behavior along the two crucial dimensions of institutional investors’ investment horizons and 
activism.”179 They conclude by mediating the horizon “debate’s “polarized rendering” in favor of 
capturing “nuances that depend on a variety of factors” that the “law and economics literature has 
paid relatively little attention to.”180  
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 This is a promising advance, although subtle and limited. It is so subtle, for instance, that 
the innovation was not among those highlighted in the editor’s overview of the symposium.181   It 
is limited in that the study uses conviction (“active share”) as a proxy for activism.182 Active share 
is usually about investment concentration, however, not inclination or style of engagement.183 It 
can be a partial proxy for activism, but concentration is a defining trait of quality (dedicated) 
shareholders. A next step in the research would tease out, within the data, those shareholders with 
high concentrations as well as long holding periods. That would be the quality shareholder 
cohort.184 A few of the many implications of doing so are reviewed next.185  
C. Policy Implications  
 Adding discussion of quality shareholders to the horizon debate would enable 
distinguishing not merely short- versus long-term but long-term with or without concentration. To 
illustrate how the addition would illuminate specific corporate law debates, consider two 
controversial governance features: staggered boards and splitting versus combining the roles of 
board chairman and CEO.  
 First, a longstanding sub-debate in corporate law considers the superiority of unitary versus 
staggered boards. With unitary boards, all seats are filled in annual elections; with staggered 
boards, each director serves a term of two or three years.186 Proponents of staggered boards stress 
advantages such as continuity and institutional knowledge while critics cite insulation from 
accountability. 
 Corporate law scholars, as well as major indexers, challenge staggered boards as 
excessively pro-management. Professor Bebchuk has been an outspoken opponent of staggered 
boards.187 Students at his law school mounted national campaigns to de-stagger boardrooms across 
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corporate America.188 He and his colleagues marshalled impressive research data to contend that 
staggered board reduced firm value.   
 In the other corner of this contentious debate stood Professor Cremers and his colleagues, 
who mounted equally intense counterarguments and opposing data sets, showing that staggered 
boards increased firm value. This camp of scholars, which included some judges and prominent 
lawyers,189 argued for staggered boards as either a default rule or as a requirement.190 
 Recent scholarship challenges the reliability of both empirical sides of the argument, 
contending instead that neither is right: whether a staggered board is good or bad depends on the 
company.191  The attempt to settle this debate is another way of recasting the horizon debate in 
more holistic terms.  In some of the empirical work, and in much of the rhetoric—described as 
“polemical”192—the board structure sub-debate was a microcosm of the horizon debate: 
proponents of staggered boards urged long-term value against short-term interests while opponents 
of staggered boards denied that they had a short-term focus.    
 In attempting to settle the debate, the scholars pointed to research myopia in the data. It 
riveted too narrowly on horizon issues to the exclusion of many other factors that bear on firm 
value. And firm value, recall, is something beheld differently by the wide variety of shareholder 
types.193  
 Moreover, Cremers and Sepe disagree that the debate is settled.194 But they are also moving 
helpfully forward to focus on shareholder time horizon as well as conviction. For example, in their 
recent symposium article, they found a higher density of quality shareholders reduces, though only 
slightly, the value of staggered boards.195 They say this might reflect that activists apply short-term 
pressure.  
 But another explanation is that quality shareholders do not take a blanket approach to 
staggered boards. The evidence suggests that quality shareholders may slightly favor companies 
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with unitary boards, those with staggered boards nevertheless attract sizable quality shareholder 
cohorts.196 Companies certainly continue to be divided on the right approach.197  
 The scholarly attempt to “settle” the board structure sub-debate is consistent with the views 
of quality shareholders on such matters: context matters, and different companies need different 
governance features. While on its face such an assertion seems obvious to make and easy to defend, 
many scholars and most indexers—but not quality shareholders—have assumed that staggered 
boards are always good or bad. Adding quality shareholders to the debate challenges that 
assumption. 
 Second, consider ongoing debate over whether to split or combine the roles of chairman of 
the board and CEO. Traditionally, the CEO held the board chairman role as well. But in recent 
years, critics have challenged such a practice. Their theory is that boards elect and oversee the 
CEO so having one person wear both hats creates a conflict. Yet that is only one vote on boards 
with many independent directors, so any conflict can easily be neutralized. 
 Many corporations thrive when led by an outstanding person serving as both chairman and 
chief executive just as others have failed when the roles are split.198 Companies are about evenly 
divided on the practice: about half the S&P 500 split the functions while the other half combine 
them.199 For their part, quality shareholders appear to think about this case-by-case and, if 
anything, slightly favor companies that combine rather than split the functions.200   
 Finally, consider a case study that illuminates the importance of both horizon and 
conviction. Professors Jennifer Riel and Roger Martin of the University of Toronto profiled the 
example of Unilever. In 2009, hoary old Unilever’s share turnover mapped that of other 
multinationals, plagued by a large portion of shareholders with holding periods of less than one 
year.201 To CEO Paul Polman, the high level of transients translated into urgent demands for 
maximizing quarterly profits and daily share prices.   
 Such a capital markets outlook adversely affected operations, strategy, and reporting. 
Unilever published quarterly earnings guidance, forming expectations among market watchers. 
Then, to meet these expectations, division managers cut spending on R&D, information 
technology, and capital projects.  
 Polman recognized this flawed strategy. He adopted new policies and clearly 
communicated these to shareholders and the market. Unilever would cease quarterly guidance and 
reporting.  It would no longer seek to deliver maximum profits each quarter or year but would seek 
consistent and sustained profits across multiple years. At first, the stock price dropped. 
 
 196 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 (within the S&P 500, 61 have staggered 
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 But within two years, it recovered and continued to rise over the next eight years, in tandem 
with sustained profits. In the process, transient shareholders were chased away, replaced by a 
concentration of long-term holders.  As of late 2017, not long before Polman retired, Unilever’s 
largest 50 owners boasted an average holding period of seven years. 
  Many of these were quality shareholders, but a substantial cohort of indexers were among 
them.202 In other words, Polman’s campaign was only half successful.  
 In 2018, after Unilever announced plans to move to an Amsterdam-only listing, rather than 
maintain its longstanding dual listing in London, indexers howled. They wanted Unilever to retain 
its London listing so that it would remain in their favored index. Unilever succumbed to their 
pressure.  
 While doing so was consistent with seeking long-term shareholders, the move 
compromised the other goal of attracting concentrated shareholders, those with conviction. Putting 
horizon and conviction together is important in practice as well as in theory.  
 
III.   PORTFOLIO CONVICTION  
 
 Corporate law professors have begun to wade into their version of the hottest debate in 
finance: passive versus active investing. As referenced at the end of Part I, the debate in finance 
concerns the relative performance of these two broad approaches to investing.203 In corporate law, 
the debate concerns the relative incentives and capacities of shareholders in these two broad 
categories to cast informed votes on corporate matters. All participants in both debates face a huge 
challenge: the two categories are not self-defining and the available tools to distinguish between 
the categories are limited.  
 Passive usually refers to an investing strategy that buys all stocks in an index, without 
requiring active decision making concerning which stocks to buy or sell, whereas active denotes 
everything else. “Everything else” is a huge diverse category, however, encompassing countless 
alternative investment strategies and styles—value, growth, momentum, chartist, quantitative.  
Finance researchers deal with this problem by exploring, within “everything else,” any strategies 
or styles that an investor could use systematically to outperform the market indexes. While that 
delineation helps researchers to canvass more comprehensively, it may often exclude distinctive 
strategies of quality shareholders who do not compare performance with annual benchmarks.204 
 In the nascent legal literature, moreover, the focus to date has been on the indexers, 
especially the largest ones, and their incentives and capacities, rather than on exploring the various 
alternative types and their incentives and capacities. For instance, a wave of current scholarship 
focuses intensively on the incentives and capabilities of the three largest indexers, contrasting 
those few firms with everything else dubbed “active.”205  
 While useful to gain insight into the major indexers, such a focus obscures the contributions 
of rivals and muddies the meaning of any related policy implications. In particular, there is a big 
difference between an “active” fund that is long- or short-term as between an active fund that is 
 
 202 Among quality shareholders, Unilever has attracted AKO Capital, Gardner Russo Gardner, and 
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heavily concentrated (1 to 20 stocks), moderately concentrated (20 to 50) or somewhat diversified 
(up to 100). While delineating every cohort for purposes of legal analysis may be more daunting 
than hunting for market-beating results in finance, it is relatively easy and highly illuminating to 
add the quality shareholder. This Part explores how to do so by incorporating perspectives on the 
quality shareholder into the principal terms of evolving debate in corporate law scholarship about 
index funds.  
  
A. Theory and Debate  
 
 The business model of the large index funds is to develop a broad portfolio of securities, 
minimize costs, and match the index. Compensation is based on size of the fund rather than 
performance of the fund, the traditional approach in the investment management industry. 
Accordingly, indexers strive to increase assets under management (AUM). Beyond that 
description, corporate law scholars begin to disagree. 
 The disagreement starts with theory. Recall references to the course of corporate life during 
the 20th century.206 The challenge of corporate life was bridging the separation of ownership from 
control and the job of corporate law was to mitigate the agency costs that arise when strong 
managers control companies with weak owners. The rise of institutional investors heralded a new 
era where such agency costs would be vastly reduced. But experience has disappointed such hopes, 
as institutional investors, holding funds for others, bring agency costs of their own.  
 Today’s scholarly disagreement concerns the magnitude of those costs and what corporate 
law might do about it. Two main rival theories contend in portraying the index fund sector. One 
account is the value maximization view. In this account, agency costs are real but modest, as funds 
have requisite incentives to act on behalf of their investors to monitor investments to assure the 
best outcomes for their investors. The rival view see as agency costs as large and forbidding,  where 
fund managers face offsetting personal incentives and lack economic incentives to invest in 
stewardship to improve the performance of particular companies.   
 Both theories have a certain appeal. Both sides can point to evidence to support their 
theories.  All positions could be improved, however, by adding the perspective of quality 
shareholders. The following reviews some leading theoretical positions on incentives of the largest 
indexers, and related evidence, with notes adding the perspective of the quality shareholder.  
 
1. Incentives 
   
 In a recent book-length article, Professors Bebchuk and Hirst make the case for an agency 
cost theory of indexing among the largest such funds.207 To start, they identify several benefits 
index fund managers may obtain from solicitude toward investee managers compared to what their 
investors would prefer. These include: business relationships, avoiding triggering regulatory 
duties that can arise from taking an adversarial stance such as securities disclosures, and 
minimizing the risk of regulatory backlash by overplaying their hand against corporate America.   
 In another long article, Professors Fisch, Hamdani and Solomon-Davidoff, counter that 
such incentives may be neutralized by fiduciary standards and moral norms.208 For their part, 
 
 206 See supra text accompanying notes 27-34. 
 207 See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 3 (120,000 words). 
 208 Fisch, Titans, supra note 3 (60,000 words). 
34 
 
Professors Kahan and Rock add a reputational argument.209 They cite the public relations 
campaigns mounted by leading industry figures, such as the letters directed to chief executives by 
BlackRock CEO Laurence Fink.  
 Norms and reputational concerns may constrain behavior, but probably imperfectly and no 
more than among other shareholder types.  For instance, while the largest index funds and their 
CEOs may have name recognition, that is not true of those who manage funds. In contrast, quality 
shareholders often put their names on the door, write books, issue newsletters, speak at 
conferences.210 They become well-known, showing substantial investment in reputation. Quality 
shareholders form exclusive membership fraternities and even offer an examination-based 
certification that is regarded as the toughest in the industry.211 
  On the other side of this debate, presenting the value maximization theory of the largest 
indexers, stand Professors Kahan and Rock.212 In an intricate draft article, they offer an account of 
the direct incentives index fund families have to increase the market capitalization of investees: 
doing so increases AUM. To Kahan and Rock, incentives are measured by the increased fees that 
follow from increases in AUM. They conclude: “the most important factor by far in determining 
how much a fund adviser stands to gain from being informed is the size of the holdings.”213 On 
that basis, they say the largest indexers—those with trillions in AUM—have the greatest 
incentives.  
 Bebchuck and Hirst respond to Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis by focusing on individual 
index fund managers.214 Their compensation is based on a tiny percentage of a fund’s AUM, so 
increasing the value of a particular investee yields little gain for them.  
 Two more fundamental problems face the AUM thesis from a quality shareholder 
perspective. First, quality shareholders do not measure themselves by the growth in size of their 
investees but by their return on shareholders’ equity over long periods of time.215 Those may often 
increase by virtue of a company shrinking in size, as through dividends, buybacks or spinoffs, not 
growing market capitalization.216 Growth in AUM due to growth in investee market capitalization 
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does not capture this source of incentives. The absence of such a baseline prevents a comparative 
assessment of the incentives of the major indexers.  
 Second, Kahan and Rock’s AUM model lacks attention to the important variables included 
in the research of Bushee and others.217 These are the variables that delineate the quality 
shareholder cohort and define its incentives. In Bushee’s model, for example, they are average 
percentage ownership of investees, the percentage of investees representing at least a 5% share of 
the portfolio, and the average size of each investment.218 The incentives that arise from having 
such high stakes in a company likely dwarf those of large indexers with relatively small stakes in 
thousands of companies. Again, in any event, the AUM incentives model fails to offer a way to 
compare the incentives of quality shareholders. 
 Professor Fisch and her co-authors offer a different account of indexes incentives to support 
their theory of indexer value maximization.219 They think that indexers compete with other 
indexers as well as with “active” funds.220 They say this competition gives indexers incentives to 
improve investee corporate governance because such improvements remove the advantages of 
stock picking. In other words, indexers try to outperform “active” rivals.  
 Bebchuk and Hirst doubt this creates indexer incentives to invest in stewardship.221 They 
explain that people migrate from “active” to passive investing because of the observed difficulty 
of funds beating market averages. Under this motivation, indexers compete for customers not with 
active funds but with fellow indexers. True, “active” funds still manage substantial assets, because 
some do beat their index benchmark, Bebchuk and Hirst theorize. That will remain so even if 
indexer stewardship increases investee value. In fact, active investors with concentrated ownership 
in given companies benefit more from indexer efforts targeted to improve such companies, hardly 
creating indexer incentives to intervene.  
 Both Fisch’s thesis and the Bebchuk-Hirst response suffer from the same problems as 
Kahan and Rock’s AUM thesis: quality shareholders do not measure their performance against 
annual index performance. Their incentives are entirely different, so such a theory of indexer 
incentives is inapposite.   
 Kahan and Rock add another perspective on the incentives debate, one that inadvertently 
touches on quality shareholders. While agreeing with Bebchuk and Hirst that indexers lack 
incentives to compete with “active” funds for new business (“inflows”), they say concentrated 
fund managers may have such incentives. Drawing on the finance literature,222 they estimate that 
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competitive funds may increase AUM via inflows by 1.3% for every point by which they beat a 
benchmark index. At certain investment concentration levels, incentives to boost inflows are 
stronger than those to increase AUM through investee growth alone, they say.  
 They instance a fund concentrating 3.5% of its portfolio in a single stock. That is the 
average level among smaller funds, with AUM around $1.2 billion. For that cohort, inflow-based 
incentives are 20% larger. On the other hand, they contrast a fund concentrating merely .5% in a 
single stock—the average level for larger funds, with AUM around $736 billion. The difference 
disappears. Overall, Kahan and Rock conclude, the inflow-based incentives of this cohort are 
slight—low for the smaller firms and scant for the larger ones.223   
 But if you change the flawed assumption of AUM growth as an incentive for quality 
shareholders and make some adjustments that are relevant to them, this approach offers some 
promise.  For example, consider medium-size quality shareholders—say with $25-50 billion in 
AUM—and concentrated holdings in some companies of 5% to 10%. Even within the AUM-based 
model, that could spell substantial inflow-based incentives. If also taking account of the actual 
incentives of quality shareholders—long-term returns on investment and strong reputations among 
constituents—their incentives could swamp those of the large indexers.224   
 Being explicit about the quality shareholder cohort, and its particular incentives that 
indexers lack, would improve the theoretical debate over the relative incentives of indexers and 
others to operate as informed shareholders. After all, many skeptics continue to doubt the 
rationality of an indexer incurring costs of x to increase investee value knowing they would share 
most of any gain with rivals, and net a tiny fraction of x.225 Kahan and Rock counter that the largest 
three indexers have stronger incentives than “most” other institutional and all but the largest 
individuals.226 Quality shareholders are certainly within the referenced population boasting 
stronger incentives.  
 
2. Capacity 
 Debate over indexer incentives leads directly to questions about their capacity for informed 
shareholder conduct. While this aspect of the debate can be measured to some degree, scholars 
view the same facts differently.  
 Participants agree that large indexers cast votes at more than 4,000 annual meetings adding 
up to more than 30,000 proposals. Champions such as Kahan and Rock stress that most do not 
matter and only a few dozen annually are important.227 They then ask if indexers have the 
demonstrated capacity to handle those and the question answers itself.228  
 Fisch and her co-authors stress that the large volume of meetings and proposals endows 
large indexers with substantial economies of scope—each vote produces knowledge useful in 
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other votes.229 Critics counter that across so many votes, little study can possibly be made, so little 
knowledge can possibly accrue.230 
 Fisch embraces the widely-publicized commitment these funds made to increase their 
stewardship staffs.231  But Bebchuk and Hirst find the results underwhelming.232 They compare 
staff size—after the vaunted increases—in relation to the number and size of companies to be 
followed. Among the largest indexers: BlackRock doubled its stewardship staff to 45; Vanguard 
has 21 people; and State Street 12. Yet these indexers have holdings in more than 11,000 
companies each worldwide, and at least 3,000 in the U.S. alone.  
 In dollar terms, total stewardship investment by these big indexers is a miniscule fraction 
of their budgets: about $13.5 million, $6.3 million, and $3.6 million, respectively, all less than 
one-fifth of 1%– only 0.2%—of total fees and expenses. Even if the staff focused only on the 
largest companies—say where their stakes exceed $1 billion, that still adds to hundreds of 
companies. They could only devote two to four person-days per year studying that small portion 
of their total portfolio.  
 The following table starkly presents the picture: 
 
Indexers’ Limited Stewardship Stakes233 
 BlackRock Vanguard SSGA 
Stewardship Staff        45        21       12 
Investees Worldwide 11,246 13,225 12,191 
Investees U.S.   3,765   3,672   3,117 
Maximum Person Day        <4        <2       <2 
    
Stewardship Expense $13.5M $6.3M $3.6M 
Total Fees & Expenses  $9.1B $3.5B $2.6B 
      
 For context, consider the head count at two other companies involved in investment 
analysis. Moody’s, the bond rating agency covering a large swath of capital markets, employs 
12,000 people. Among the largest quality shareholders, Capital Research, which keeps up with a 
far smaller portfolio of companies, 7,500. 
 Bebchuk and Hirst find it hard to believe that the limited resources of the large indexers 
suffice to yield informed opinions on the tens of thousands of shareholder decisions required of an 
owner of shares in many thousands of companies.  Even if Kahan and Rock are right that most are 
quotidian and few grave,  Bebhcuk and Hirst say at least a significant portion would require some 
knowledge that would entail reading the annual report and proxy statement, determining the 
company’s strategic plan and past performance, components of its executive compensation plans, 
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and pending shareholder and management proposals. Yet the evidence indicates that the big 
indexers access only 29% of governance related public filings of their investees.234  
 Fisch and her colleagues stress the extensive private engagement in which the large 
indexers say they are heavily engaged.235 Bebchuk and Hirst probe the data to find the probabilities 
and public record pointing to inherent limitations. From 2017 through 2019, the largest indexers 
reported having multiple annual engagements with only a handful of their investees—3.9% at 
Blackrock, 2.3% at Vanguard, and 0.6% at State Street; they had just one engagement with another 
7.2%, 3.5%, and 5.0%, respectively.236 In other words, over a recent three-year period, these firms 
had no engagement with the overwhelming majority of the companies they invest in.  
 The implication of the current debate may be that indexer critics would prefer the rest of 
the investment community—the group so often dubbed “active” without delineation—to seize 
power in the shareholder voting arena. But at least for Bebchuk and Hirst, that is not the case. They 
see high agency costs across the investment community.237 The upshot of their critique for them 
is to create incentives to induce indexers to engage more and become more active. But there is 
more to the debate, concerning the indexers’ favored approach of using formulaic guidelines to 
cast votes, and how different that is from the quality shareholder approach.    
  
B. Guideline Best Practices  
 All the major indexes, as well as two leading specialist companies that advise the rest of 
the institutional investor market on shareholder voting, publish guidelines on their views of 
corporate best practices. Rather than examining each vote in the context of a particular company, 
these guidelines promote certain precepts for all companies: splitting the roles of board chairman 
and CEO, annual rather than staggered terms for directors, and simple majority shareholder voting. 
Scholars have different views on what this approach says about the indexers. 
 Critics say it reflects the thin staffing that would prevent firms from reaching an informed 
opinion for each particular company. Just as the large indexers are stretched thin, so too are the 
two main proxy advisers,. ISS and Glass Lewis. Both operate with lean staffs on low budgets, and 
just 1,000 employees at ISS and 1,200 at Glass Lewis. Yet they address a huge market: ISS boasts 
1,700 institutional clients while Glass Lewis’s clients together manage $35 trillion in assets.238 
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Their small crews opine on hundreds of thousands of separate decisions annually—ISS addresses 
40,000 annual meetings and Glass Lewis 20,000.239   
 In contrast, proponents of indexers treat the guideline approach as an efficient 
demonstration of economies of scope.240 Kahan and Rock theorize that the indexers have a special 
advantage concerning broad market wide issues to which the guidelines speak, such as the relative 
appeal of staggered boards.241 They acknowledge, however, that other investors may have an 
advantage when it comes to firm-specific issues such as a given director’s fit for a particular board. 
Of course, few issues are purely firm-specific or purely issue-specific, but they think the degree of 
importance varies and can delineated.242  
 One concern with the guideline method, however, is it condones a once-size-fits-all 
approach to corporate governance. While Kahan and Rock deny holding any such view,243 others 
come closer to countenancing it. For example, Fisch and colleagues say indexers compete by 
“engaging in broad-based efforts to improve the overall performance of the market, addressing 
cross-cutting issues such as corporate governance, risk management, cybersecurity and 
sustainability.”244 That is notable for its suggestion that, rather than trying to maximize the 
prosperity of each given company in the index, indexers seek to get the highest market return. 
 In developing their theory of the value indexers add to corporate governance, Fisch and 
colleagues cited several empirical finance articles showing an association between high indexer 
density in a shareholder base and various governance features the indexers favor, such as more 
independent directors, fewer takeover defenses and equalized shareholder voting rights.245 But 
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Bebchuk and Hirst pointed out an uncited subsequent paper reporting similar research revealing 
that such high indexer density is associated with certain reforms indexers disfavor, such as CEOs 
becoming chairman.246 
 No issue is so generic as to be universal—not even the ritualistic shareholder ratification 
of an auditor of the company’s financial reports.247 The same is true for a wide variety of guideline 
practices whose utility and value varies by company and is heavily debated in the literature.248 
That’s certainly the quality shareholder view. Among the best illustrations of the stakes and the 
different approaches between indexers and quality shareholders concerns the central nervous 
system of corporate life: directors and boards, discussed next.  
   
C. Directors and Boards 
 Corporate law puts boards of directors at the center of corporate governance.249 Corporate 
law empowers shareholders to elect directors. It is perhaps the shareholders’ most consequential 
decision. Yet approaches to this critical issue vary widely between indexers and quality 
shareholders. It would illuminate the indexing debate to compare and contrast these two 
approaches. The following first reviews the formulaic approach of the indexer guidelines and 
second the analytical approach of the quality shareholder.250   
1. Indexer Guidelines  
 Consider the approach of the leading proxy adviser, Institutional Shareholder Service 
(ISS).  ISS opens its discussion of the board of directors not with statements of competence or 
corporate stewardship, but with “four fundamental principles [that] apply when determining votes 
on director nominees.”251 These are enumerated as independence, composition, responsiveness 
and accountability.  Only the assessment of “responsiveness” is contextual—voting “case-by-
base.”    
 On independence, ISS makes three prescriptions: (1) a majority of directors must be 
independent; (2) the board must have three standing committees operating under formal charters 
 
 246 Cornelius Schmidt & Rüdiger Fahlenbrach, Do Exogenous Changes in Passive Institutional 
Ownership Affect Corporate Governance and Firm Value?, 124 J. Fin. Econ. 285, 293–94 (2017). Another 
criticism of asserting an association between indexer density and their favored policies, like 
reducing takeover defenses, is that many other informed participants contend that such defenses 
are sometimes desirable and should be evaluated case-by-case.  Sharon Hannes, The Hidden Virtue 
of Antitakeover Defenses, 24 Cardozo L. Rev. 1903 (2003); Sharon Hannes, The Market for Takeover 
Defenses, 101 Nw. U.L. Rev. 125 (2007).  
 247 See, e.g., J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Politicization of Corporate Governance: Bureaucratic 
Discretion, the SEC, and Shareholder Ratification of Auditors, 2 Harv. Bus. L. Rev. 501, 511 (2012). 
 248 E.g., supra notes 187-195 and accompanying text (staggered boards); supra notes 196-200 and 
accompanying text (CEO-chairman split or combined).  
 249 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020). 
 250 Indexer critics note a further anomaly: indexers seldom nominate directors. In fact, during the 
past five years, none of the largest three indexers have formally nominated a single director to any public 
company board See Bebchuk & Hirst, Index Funds, supra note 3. In contrast, quality shareholders 
frequently suggest nominees and quite a few have served on boards themselves. See Cunningham, Quality 
Shareholders, supra note 8 (chapter 3). 
 251 Institutional Shareholder Service, Proxy Voting Guidelines (2019) [hereinafter ISS Guidelines]. 
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and staffed only with independent directors—audit, compensation, and nominating; and (3) there 
must either be a lead independent director or an independent chairman (not also serving as an 
executive officer).  
 Many such rules have become commonly accepted in recent decades, but the empirical 
evidence on their economic value remains inconclusive.252 Consider the issue of director 
independence.253 Some evidence suggests a board’s independence is less important than its active 
engagement.254 Other evidence suggests that certain kinds of outside directors improve the 
performance of certain functions, such as adherence to accounting requirements.255 But, clearly, 
there is a trade-off between the expertise of inside directors and the independence of outside 
directors.256 
 On composition, ISS again states three rules: (1) directors should have diverse skills that 
add value to the board, rather than duplicating backgrounds from particular viewpoints, ideally 
presented in a graphical skills matrix to illustrate; (2) regular meeting attendance is expected, 
defined as at least 75% of meetings of the full board and committees; and (3) attention is expected, 
determined by caps on the number of public company boards individual directors may serve—five 
in general or two for CEOs. 257 
 Critics challenge these composition directives as intrusive and formulaic. Taking (2) and 
(3) first, attendance and attention are clearly necessary, but not sufficient, to determine a valuable 
board member.  Rules of thumb are useful, but that’s not how these rules operate. That is why the 
board of directors’ section of so many corporate websites portray check marks ticking off all the 
governance formulas that major indexers and proxy advisors champion. Attention is important, 
but caps are clearly arbitrary.258 
 On accountability, ISS calls for regular director elections, opposes staggered terms, and 
believes in shareholder removal power, with or without cause. But state corporate law permits all 
these and many other approaches to director election and removal, and leaves it to companies to 
choose those best suited for their circumstances. As we have seen, there are good arguments to 
evaluate these on a case-bay-case basis.259  
 
 252 See supra text accompanying notes supra notes 196-200 and accompanying text (addressing the 
issue of the role of the chairman/CEO). The listed committees are functionally required by law; other 
committee subjects are mentioned infra text accompanying notes 267-268.  
 253   E.g., Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition 
and Firm Performance, 54 Bus. Law. 921 (1999); Sanjai Bhagat & Bernard Black, The Non-Correlation 
Between Board Independence and Long-Term Firm Performance, 27 J. Corp. L. 231 (2002).  
 254 See Ira M. Millstein & Paul W. MacAvoy, The Active Board of Directors and Performance of 
the Large Publicly Traded Corporation, 98 Colum. L. Rev. 1283 (1998).   
 255 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Rediscovering Board Expertise: Legal Implications of the 
Empirical Literature, 77 U. Cinn. L. Rev. 465 (2008). 
 256 See Usha Rodrigues, The Fetishization of Independence, 33 J. Corp. L. 447 (2008). 
 257 ISS Guidelines, supra note 251. 
 258 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8, at 8(giving the example of ISS opposing 
nomination of widely-recognized executive and director for exceeding the board service limit due solely to 
fact that an incumbent company was divided into two separate entities).   
 259 E.g., supra notes 187-195 and accompanying text (staggered boards); supra notes 196-200 and 
accompanying text (CEO-chairman split or combined). A final prong of ISS’s accountability plank 
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2. Comparing Quality  
 Warren Buffett has often expressed his views on ideal directors and boards—ideas that 
have a wide following among the rest of the quality shareholder cohort.260 They seek directors 
with a shareholder orientation, business savvy, and interest in the particular company and its 
stewardship.261 Particular director traits and the specific context of a given company are more 
important than following general formulas or perceived best practices.    
 The number-one question quality shareholders want to know about any director candidates, 
however, is whether they are shareholder oriented. That is, all directors should act as if there is a 
single absentee owner and do everything reasonably possible to advance that owner’s long-term 
interest.262  
 This is not a mandate for the immediate maximization of shareholder value, but rather a 
mentality to evaluate every decision from the shareholder perspective. To that end, it is desirable 
for directors to buy and hold sizable personal stakes in companies they serve, so that they truly 
walk in the shoes of owners.263 
 The board’s most important job is selecting an outstanding CEO. If the board secures an 
outstanding CEO, it will likely face few other major problems. All CEOs must be measured 
according to a set of performance standards. A board’s outside directors must formulate these 
standards and regularly evaluate the CEO in light of them—without the CEO being present.264   
 Standards should be tailored to the particular business culture but should stress 
fundamental baselines, such as returns on shareholder capital and progress in market value per 
share over multiple years. Above all, directors should evaluate the CEOs record on capital 
allocation measured against a hurdle rate it sets.265 
 If the CEO’s performance persistently falls short of the standards set by the directors, then 
the board must replace the CEO. The same goes for all other senior managers boards oversee, just 
as an intelligent owner would if present.  
 In addressing these problems, the director’s actions must be fair, swift, and decisive. 
Directors who perceive a managerial problem should immediately alert other directors to the issue. 
If enough are persuaded, concerted action can be readily coordinated to resolve the problem. 
 Here, too, shareholders can play a role. Companies can make their directors available to 
 
prescribes that each board undertake regular performance reviews of itself. This is another fashion in 
corporate governance that is reinforced by consulting firms offering the service Christopher D. McKenna, 
The World’s Newest Profession: Management Consulting in the Twentieth Century (2006). The task of 
self-evaluation, while important, is challenging, and observers are justified in skepticism about the results. 
 260 See Lawrence A. Cunningham, Warren Buffett’s Ten Commandments for Directors, NACD 
Directorship (July-August 2017); European Financial Review (July-August 2017); and CNBC (July 2017). 
 261 See Buffett & Cunningham, The Essays, supra note  17. 
 262 Id. at 45. 
 263 Id. at 31-32 (Berkshire’s owner-related business principles, number 2). 
 264 Id.  
 265 See Phil Ordway: Case Studies of Companies That Do Capital Allocation Right, The Manual of 
Ideas (2019). 
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their largest long-term quality shareholders.266 These representatives can discuss issues put to 
shareholder votes that affect enduring value. A few influential quality shareholders, acting together, 
can effectively reform a given company’s corporate governance simply by withholding their votes 
for directors who were tolerating odious behavior.  
 On board committees, finally, corporate law requires that boards approve major 
acquisitions and dividends, and as a practical matter to approve share buyback programs.267 Along 
with such approvals, good practice dictates that the board’s principal role is setting applicable 
hurdle rates, for reinvestment and acquisitions.  
 Companies wishing to make capital allocation a priority could consider whether to create 
a board committee with this oversight. At S&P 500 companies, boards maintain an average of four 
committees, and about 1/3 include a committee on capital allocation, finance or investment.268 
Charters might call for post-investment reviews on all important allocations, especially organic 
growth initiatives, acquisitions, and share buybacks.  
 With capital allocation being the central driver of business value, from the quality 
shareholders’ analytical perspective, it is natural that this cohort would discuss the idea of a board 
committee on the subject. The indexer guidelines, of course, do not.    
 
3. A Note on Activists  
 A turn to the subset of quality shareholder who go activist is in order.  Activist shareholders 
regularly identify and recruit able director nominees to serve on boards of corporations they target. 
These director nominees are often experts in the relevant industry or on aspects of perceived board 
weaknesses, such as corporate governance. They may often be the kinds of directors quality 
shareholders would seek and nominate themselves. But the context where such nominations arise 
can compromise actual or perceived stewardship.  
 First, there is longstanding concern that directors appointed as the result of activist support 
will be more beholden to the activist than to the other shareholders. This concern is constrained 
somewhat by a director’s fiduciary duties, which require acting for the corporation, not any 
particular shareholder.  
 But circumstances can aggravate the problem. For instance, some activists have offered 
their nominees bonuses for achieving stated corporate results during their tenure, including certain 
stock price levels. Such “golden leashes,” as they are called, increase the risk that the director is 
beholden to the sponsor. 
 In addition, a payout set based on stock price could influence important business 
judgments, such as optimal borrowing levels and whether to make or accept acquisition offers. For 
these reasons, special bonuses for certain directors risk creating board factions and infighting. 
 Second, when appointed as the result of a settlement, outside normal governance 
procedures, the other shareholders did not get a vote. Such arrangements can lead to board 
members that appeal unduly to the activist and incumbents.  
 
 266 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8 (chapter 8). 
 267 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 154 (2020) (dividends); § 160 (repurchases technically do not 
explicitly require board approval but statutory rules violations expose directors to personal liability); § 251 
(mergers). 
 268 See Ordway supra note 265. 
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 One solution to this problem is to put settlements to votes of the other shareholders.269 This 
would assure appointment of directors with consensus support, as well as validate any other aspects 
of the settlement, such as committee assignments, director removal, terms and term limits and 
corporate governance guidelines.270  
 
● ● ● ● ● 
  
 The indexing debate over incentives, capacity, and “guideline” approach to governance is 
vital.  It can be enriched by adding the perspective of the quality shareholder. All of this matters, 
above all, because of the increasingly important role shareholders play in corporate governance. 
The frequency and significance of shareholder voting and the fragmentation of shareholder types 
is what leads to ultimate debates in corporate law concerning shareholder voting, to which we turn 
next.  
 
IV.  SHAREHOLDER VOTING 
 State corporate law requires corporations to submit certain matters to a shareholder vote.271 
These matters include election and removal of directors, by-law or charter amendments, mergers, 
substantial asset divestments, and dissolution.272 Federal securities law supplements these state 
laws by regulating the process of shareholder voting,273 and sometimes requiring votes, most 
notably on executive compensation.274 Managers or shareholders can make additional proposals 
calling for a shareholder vote, on topics ranging from interested transactions to disclosures about 
climate change.275 
 
 269  John H. Matheson & Vilena Nicolett, Shareholder Democracy and Special Interest Governance, 
103 Minn. L. Rev. 1650 (2019). These authors start with the premise that shareholder democracy is a virtue, 
manifested in improved governance or voting on staggered boards, majority elections, say on pay, proxy 
access. They are concerned that settlement of activist threats impairs democracy. It operates outside main 
governance mechanisms through private means advancing private agendas—of both activists and target 
boards against the rest of the shareholders. They analogize to other similar settings—threats to corporate 
control to interested director transactions—to offer a statute making such settlement agreements void unless 
approved by a majority of the other shares.   
 270 Finally, investors with holding periods less than one year cast votes in annual elections despite 
the fact that they will not continue to be a shareholder for the directors’ full term. Even investors with 
holding periods less than two or three years who cast votes in electing staggered boards will not be around 
for as long as the directors they elect.  
 271 See Julian Velasco, The Fundamental Rights of the Shareholder, 40 U.C. Davis L. Rev. 407, 413 
(2006). 
 272 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 211 (2020) (director elections); § 242 (charter amendments); § 251 
(mergers); Model Bus. Corp. Act § 11.04 (mergers); § 10.03 (charter amendments); 10.20 (bylaw 
amendments).  
 273 17 C.F.R. § 240.14(a) (2019). 
 274 Dodd-Frank Section 951(a)(2); Exchange Act Section 14A(a)(2); 15 U.S.C. § 78n-1(a)(2). 
 275 Lisa M. Fairfax, Social Activism Through Shareholder Activism, 76 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 1129 
(2019). 
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 State corporate law provides that each corporate share is entitled to one vote on all such 
matters, unless a company’s charter adopts a different rule.276 State law permits a wide variety of 
alternative voting regimes, including several classes of shares with different voting rights; shares 
without votes or with multiple votes; as well as shares that accrue votes when held for long periods 
or that enjoy fewer votes when held by a large block owner.277 Although federal securities laws 
defer almost entirely to state corporate law on voting rules, stock exchange rules limit some of this 
variation, at least for companies already listed.278 
 While state corporate law grants vast power to boards of directors to oversee and manage 
a corporation,279 these shareholder voting rules give shareholders a significant voice on many 
consequential issues. In recent years, the number and importance of matters submitted for 
shareholder voting have both increased.280 Fragmentation of the shareholder base has accentuated 
the importance of shareholder voting, as this is the favored route for shareholder activists to shape 
corporate policy and an occasion when indexers wield their power. These forces have combined 
to produce experimentation with alternative voting arrangements.  
 Although the baseline voting rule remains one share one vote, more companies have 
switched to alternatives and debate has ensued.281 In this debate, the traditional rule is heralded as 
a democratic gold standard, against which all alternatives must be measured.  This Part reviews 
the three alternatives that have attracted the most attention: dual class, tenured, and exclusionary, 
putting each in context, and assessing the pros and cons.  
 The review leads logically to a novel alternative, which I propose, that increases the power 
of long-term committed owners—quality shareholders. I dub this regime “quality voting.” Besides 
logical closure in relating the relevant elements of the debate to voting rules, quality voting will 
appeal to companies interested in attracting higher densities of quality shareholders.   
 
A.  Dual Class: Anti-Activist 
 The one-share, one-vote regime is easiest to conceptualize and implement in a company 
with a single class of stock outstanding. Every share of that class has one vote, and all other 
shareholder rights are the same, as to matters such as dividends or liquidation rights. But state 
corporate law has long permitted companies to have more than one class of stock, with variable 
voting and other rights, so long as the rights of each class are the same within the class.282 This 
approach is valuable to enable issuing preferred stock, for instance, a security that blends features 
 
 276 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2020). 
 277 See Velasco, supra note 271. 
 278 See Paul Mason et al., Does Shareholder Voting Matter? Evidence From the Takeover Market, 
53 Wake Forest L. Rev. 157 (2018). 
 279 E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 141(a) (2020). 
 280 See Fisch et al., The New Titans, supra note 3. 
 281 E.g., Grant M. Hayden & Matthew T. Bodie, One Share, One Vote, and the False Promise of 
Shareholder Homogeneity, 30 Cardozo L. Rev. 445 (2008); Paul H. Edelman & Randall S. Thomas, 
Corporate Voting and the Takeover Debate, 58 Vand. L. Rev. 453, 464 (2005). 
 282 E.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act. § 8.04. 
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of common equity with debt.283  
 While allowable under state corporate law, maintaining two classes of common stock has 
sparked controversy since at least 1925. The details of each dual class structure vary, but the 
general design grants greater voting power to one class than to the other. Participants all see a 
trade-off between the increased incentives of those with the greater voting power to make value 
enhancing decisions and the decreased monitoring capability of those with lesser voting power. 
People disagree, often strongly, about the net effects of the trade-off. This Section charts the 
regulatory path of this debate back to 1925 through today, stressing how a greater emphasis on the 
distinctive role that quality shareholders play would add to this debate. 
1. Law and Practice 
 In a famous 1925 offering, Dodge Brothers, Inc. adopted two classes of stock, with 
different voting rights.284  One class had multiple votes per share while the other had the usual one 
vote per share.  A public howl of protest erupted, as the era’s populists condemned the lopsided 
arrangement. Critics observed that the owner of the high-vote stock held shares worth only $2.25 
million in a company with a market value of $130 million—yet controlled a majority of the voting 
power.  
 In this era, such matters were governed entirely by state corporation law, though this 
episode  contributed to the forces leading to enacting of federal securities laws in 1933 along with 
exploring how stock exchange listing rules could supplement state corporate law.285 The real issue 
with such dual class capital structures is that they vest control in a group without matching 
economic risks: despite equal investments, one class has more votes per share than the other. The 
controlling class is insulated from short term pressure but also from accountability.   
 In the aftermath of the Dodge Brothers offering, the stock exchanges barred listing of new 
companies using multiple classes of stock. That ban remained in effect through 1985. The New 
York Stock Exchange granted a few waivers, with conditions, particularly when founders showed 
having special skills or vision warranting such enhanced power.286 Other exchanges, such as 
Nasdaq, also banned dual class subject to conditions such as a minimum portion of minority board 
seats, a maximum ratio of control shares to minority shares, and anti-dilution protections.  
 In the late 1980s, the dual class structure’s voting arrangement captured newfound public 
attention after many boards began to use it defeat unwanted tender offer bids.287 In a common 
practice, a company facing a threat to control would recapitalize by offering to replace one existing 
class of stock with two new classes. One of the new classes offered low voting rights but high 
 
 283 See Lawrence E. Mitchell, The Puzzling Paradox of Preferred Stock (and Why We Should Care 
About It), 51 Bus. Law. 443, 445 (1996). 
 284 See Joel Seligman, Equal Protection in Shareholder Voting Rights: The One Common Share, 
One Vote Controversy, 54 Geo. Wash. L. Rev. 687 (1986).     
 285 See John C. Coffee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the 
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 Yale L.J. 1 (2001).  
 286 For instance, in 1980 it listed Nike Inc., whose shares were identical except that those held by 
founder Phil Knight could elect ¾ of the board. Knight said he would not have taken the company public 
otherwise.  
 287 See Jeffery N. Gordon, Ties That Bond: Dual Class Common Stock and the Problem of 
Shareholder Choice, 76 Cal. L. Rev. 3, 44 (1988). 
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dividends while the other offered the reverse.288 
 As board’s making such an offering intended, managers and other pro-management 
shareholders traded their shares for the high vote class while public shareholders, preferring cash 
dividends to abstract voting rights, went for the low vote class. While state corporate law allowed 
such a gambit, the SEC regarded the practice as coercive. In 1989, it adopted a federal rule 
prohibiting stock exchanges from listing companies proposing dual class capital structures.289  
 A federal court struck the SEC’s rule on administrative grounds.290 But the exchanges 
nevertheless adopted the listing rules, and they remain in effect.291 These rules apply to existing 
companies, barring recapitalizations, but not to newly-listed companies with dual class structures 
upon initial public offerings (IPOs). Dual class structures have been particularly appealing to new 
listings for technology companies, with a wave of such offerings occurring in the mid-2000s as 
the tech sector rallied and again in the last few years since 2017. Today, some 250 companies 
maintain dual class capital structures.292   
2. Debate and Data 
 In the longstanding debate, proponents of dual class argue that entrepreneurs need to retain 
voting control to protect their companies from intense, short-sighted pressure of activist 
shareholders. The reasoning follows, however, that the founder’s “special sauce” offers initial 
value, but tends to fade with time and depends on consistent personal engagement.     
 More recently, debate has come to focus on duration: people could accept the structure as 
long as it wasn’t permanent.293 The question being asked was: how long would the dual class terms 
endure and under what circumstances might they cease? Before 2000, nearly two-thirds of dual 
class offerings had no sunset provisions. But expiration terms have become common, whether at 
fixed times such as five to ten years or upon events such as the founder’s death or incapacity.294  
 Despite such compromises, extreme cases arise that lead to extreme reactions. Take the 
2017 IPO of Snap Inc., whose public shares carried no voting rights. Many observers 
 
 288 See Louis Lowenstein, Shareholder Voting Rights: A Response to SEC Rule 19c-4 and to 
Professor Gilson, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 979 (1989). 
 289  SEC Rel. Nos. 34-25891, 34-25891A (July, 1988). 
 290 Bus. Roundtable v. SEC, 905 F.2d 406, 407-08 (D.C. Cir. 1990). 
 291 See Stephen M. Bainbridge, The Short Life and Resurrection of SEC Rule 19c-4, 69 Wash. U. 
L. Q. 5675 (1991). 
 292 See Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List (2017) (culled from Russell 
3000 companies), available at https://www.cii.org/files/3_17_17_List_of_DC_for_Website(1).pdf. 
Actually, quite a few have multiple classes of stock with varying voting rights, so they are “multiple class” 
capital structures but the phrase “dual class” is most commonly used to capture all variations. 
 293 See Lucian A. Bebchuk & Kobi Kastiel, The Untenable Case for Perpetual Dual-Class Stock, 
103 Va. L. Rev. 585 (2017). 
 294 See Jill Fisch & Steven Davidoff Solomon, The Problem of Sunsets, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1057 
(2019) (protesting calendar expiration dates though willing to accept event-driven terminations). 
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fulminated.295 Some campaigned for the SEC or stock exchanges to ban the practice.296 Although 
authorities refrained, advocates persuaded certain market index compilers to exclude such 
companies from their indexes,297 adding a new force in corporate governance.298  
 Advocates for dual class take a different view. As Professor Lund explains, the debate over 
nonvoting stock—and dual class generally—pits critics concerned that the approach impairs 
accountability against proponents who stress the long-term value.299 She then explored how such 
capital structures segment the shareholder base into informed and uninformed investors. Informed 
investors are better motivated to support optimal governance for long-term value, and may even 
pay a premium to own higher-voting stock. Companies catering to different shareholder types with 
such tailored share offerings therefore increase firm value, she says.300 
 Turning to the evidence, it does not support a flat ban on dual class structures nor a 
universal endorsement of them. First, despite being excluded from some indexes, many companies 
continue to offer them and many shareholders continue to buy them.301 The number and percentage 
of newly listed companies with dual class structures has not changed much302—though the total 
market capitalization of such companies has fallen substantially.303 The frequency and duration of 
sunset provisions has not moved much either—about 1/5 of new dual class structures continue to 
have sunsets, typically after ten years.  
 Second, many dual class structures are carefully tailored to suit individual corporate and 
shareholder circumstances. For example, about 15 companies use complex formulas to allocate 
corporate power and another 15 provide for specific allocations of board seats, some by number 
of slots and others by percentage.304 Several adjust the voting rules on extraordinary matters such 
 
 295 Council of Institutional Investors, Position Paper on Dual Class [hereinafter CII Multi-Class 
Paper] (calling the Snap IPO “egregious”). For a calmer, intellectual approach, see Amy Deen Westbrook 
and David A. Westbrook, Snapchat’s Gift: Equity Culture in High-Tech Firms, 46 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 861 
(2019). 
 296 CII Multi-Class Paper, supra note 295 (reporting numerous investor requests to major index 
providers to exclude multi-class structures). 
 297 Id. (reporting that FTSE Russell excludes any company whose share float is less than 5% of 
total voting power; S&P Dow prospectively excludes any company adopting multi-class). 
 298 See Scott Hirst & Kobi Kasitel, Corporate Governance by Index Exclusion, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 
1229 (2019).   
 299 Dorothy S. Lund, Nonvoting Shares and Efficient Corporate Governance, 71 Stan. L. Rev. 697 
(2019). 
 300 Distinguishing between informed and uninformed shareholders is useful to probe shareholder 
base, cultivation, and related policies. Standing alone, however, the attribute is difficult to test. Other 
behavioral categories probe this factor, however, particularly the combination of horizon and conviction.  
 301 See Council of Institutional Investors, Dual-Class IPO Snapshot: 2017-2019 Statistics. 
 302 Id. (19%, 11%, and 26% in 2017, 2018, 2019 (through first half), respectively). 
 303 Id. (49%, 17% and 15%). 
 304 See Council of Institutional Investors, Dual Class Companies List (2017) (culled from Russell 
3000 companies), available at https://www.cii.org/files/3_17_17_List_of_DC_for_Website(1).pdf. 
[hereinafter CII, Dual Class List] (for instance, at Forest City Realty Trust, Graham Holdings, Madison 
Square Garden, Scholastic, and Scripps, one class is entitled to elect a majority of the board, typically 2/3, 
while another can elect the rest). Some have plain vanilla terms—more votes on all matters to one class 
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as mergers, either reducing the super-voting shares to one vote or increasing the other class to one 
vote.305 
 Third, and most important for this Article’s thesis: quality shareholders often embrace 
companies with dual class structures. Among companies with dual class structures, most attract a 
high density of quality shareholders.306 One reason for this appetite, particularly in contrast to the 
indexers’ universal condemnation: a categorial condemnation of dual class capital structures 
ignores their utility in specific scenarios.307  
 In fact, one leading voice in the quality shareholder community publishes an investment 
advisory entitled “index orphans.”308 It highlights investment opportunities among excellent 
companies expelled from the indexes for various reasons, including thanks to having dual class 
structures. 
 As this evidence suggests, debates over the merits of dual class would benefit by 
considering views of the quality shareholder cohort.     
B. Tenured Voting: Anti-Transient 
  Scholars whose normative goal is to encourage long-term share ownership have recently 
advocated for increasing the voting power of long-held shares. This concept—synonymously 
called tenured voting, time-weighted voting or time-phased voting—prescribes that a share’s 
voting power is increased after it has been held for a given number of years.  
 A common approach grants four votes instead of one to each share held longer than four 
years. When those shares are sold, they revert back to one-vote shares. Designs vary to suit, with 
differences in the definitions of short and long term (upping votes after three, five or ten years 
say),  reward increments (adding one vote per two years or two votes per one year), and matters 
covered (all matters coming to a vote or only designated matters, such as mergers).309 
 In theory, by rewarding long-term ownership, average holding periods should rise and 
stock volatility fall. From the shareholders’ viewpoint, tenured voting remains as democratic as 
one-share, one-vote: all shares and shareholders enjoy identical opportunities to gain enhanced 
 
than another, including some 50 companies within the Russell 3000 that have at least one class of stock 
without any voting rights. Id. 
 305 Id. (examples: News Corporation, Sinclair Broadcast, Sonic Automotive, Virtu Financial).  
 306 See Cunningham, Quality Shareholders, supra note 8. The analysis compares CII’s list of 225 
companies with my ranking of companies based on the density of quality shareholders in their shareholder 
base. In particular, 135 companies appear on both lists. Among those, 64% appeared in the top half for 
quality shareholder density.    
 307 Adopters include family companies (such as Tootsie Roll Industries); entrepreneur firms (such 
as Tilly’s); and those whose industries demand with a long-term focus, such as journalism (New York 
Times Co.), spirits (Brown Forman) and finance (Houlihan Lokey).  
 308 See Boyar Research, Boyar's Index Orphans (vol. XLIII, Issue VII & VIII) (October 12, 2017). 
Boyar has identified some 750 public companies of this sort—all with market capitalizations exceeding $1 
billion and 60 exceeding $10 billion. Examples: IAC/InterActiveCorp, Axalta Coating Systems, Madison 
Square Garden Company, and MSG Networks. 
 309 See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 901 (“Each implementation can have a different effect on 
the shifting of influence among the shareholding population.”). 
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voting rights.310 
 A major and underappreciated problem, however, is that holding period length is an 
imperfect proxy for wisdom or good judgment.311 After all, if long-term shareholders are indexers 
with insufficient interest in particular companies while newer shareholders are prepared to engage 
productively, tenured voting backfires.312  
 While the emerging literature is increasingly robust, most of the analysis has focused on 
the horizon effects of tenured voting, with limited attention to this issue of conviction. This sub-
section reviews the prevailing literature while stressing that an equal emphasis on conviction 
should inform debate over tenured voting.  
1. Law and Theory  
 Unlike dual class, only a dozen U.S. public companies have ever adopted tenured voting, 
though laws in France and Italy since 2014 have required it for many public companies there.313    
As a result, far less scholarly attention had been paid to tenured voting, until recent years.314 
Interest in tenured voting was sparked by a series of major articles led by Lynne Dallas, appearing 
in 2012, 2016 and 2017.315 Since then, in addition to numerous passing references, two important 
articles on shareholder cultivation treated the innovation carefully316 and two more recent articles 
take the topic up head on.317      
 
 310 See Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker, 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). 
 311 See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 902. 
 312  See Richard, Buxbaum, The Internal Division of Powers in Corporate Governance, 73 Cal. L. 
Rev. 1671, 1718-1719 (1985) (among the earliest criticisms, calling tenured voting “problematical” and a 
“showstopper” against hostile takeover bids since shares, upon purchase by hostile bidder, would lose 
voting power for several years, longer than any could wait, making this anti-takeover defense 
“immovable”).   
 313 In France, lawmakers in 2014 made tenured voting the default for listed French companies, 
unless shareholders vote to opt out of it. Many companies, including half the largest listed companies, have 
been using tenured voting, with a two-year minimum holding period, Early empirical results suggest 
considerable value associated with tenured voting—called loyalty shares in France. See Francois Belot, 
Edith Ginglinger & Laura T. Starks, Encouraging Long-Term Shareholders: The Effects of Loyalty Shares 
with Double Voting Rights, www.ssrn.com/abstract=3475429 (2019). Companies opting out of loyalty 
shares suffered a negative market reaction while those adhering to tenured voting enjoyed a positive market 
reaction. The theory? Loyalty shares encourage costly monitoring by long-term shareholders, providing 
potential benefits to all shareholders. 
 314  This assertion is based on a Lexis search in the law review library for “time-phased voting” or 
“time-weighted voting” or “tenured voting.” Aside from a flurry of references during the period surrounding 
the SEC’s intervention concerning dual class recaps, scattered and indirect references appeared in the 
following years during that period (one per year unless otherwise noted): 1999, 2000, 2002, 2004, 2005 
(three times, all in lists of examples), 2006, 2007 (two times), 2008 (two times), 2009, 2010. 
 315 Lynne L. Dallas, Short-Termism, the Financial Crisis, and Corporate Governance, 37 J. Corp. 
L. 265 (2012); Dallas & Barry (2016), supra note 9; Lynne Dallas, Is There Hope for Change? The 
Evolution of Conceptions of “Good” Corporate Governance, 54 San Diego L. Rev. 491 (2017). 
 316 See Belinfanti, Cultivation, supra note 62; Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78. 
 317 See Berger et al., supra note 4; Edelman et al., supra note 4. 
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 Most of this literature reviews the legal authority to permit tenured voting. These discuss 
state corporation law as well as stock exchange listing rules—the federal securities laws having 
virtually no role since the SEC’s aborted flirtation with intervening in the dual class context.318 
The consensus is overwhelming that state corporation law, certainly in the leading state of 
Delaware, authorizes this and many other variations of voting arrangements.319 
 Two landmark cases support this consensus conclusion, one by analogy and one directly. 
In the analogy case, Providence & Worcester Co. v. Baker320 upheld a scaled voting scheme where 
voting power varied with a shareholders’ stake—in this case, the greater the stake, the lower the 
voting power.321 Plaintiffs challenged the scheme under a state corporate statute requiring uniform 
voting powers by class.322 In rejecting this challenge, the court reasoned that the provision applied 
equally to every share, and thus was uniform as to shares, and operated unevenly only as to those 
shareholders crossing certain ownership levels.323  
 The other landmark case, Williams v. Geier,324 directly upheld a proposed tenured voting 
structure. Existing shares won ten votes per share. Upon their transfer, they would revert to one 
vote per share, and newly issued shares would also have one vote per share—but all those held 36 
months would accrue ten votes.  The court considered the board’s proposal to be an ordinary 
business judgment, entitled to utmost judicial deference.325 
  If scholars agree that the case law clearly upholds tenured voting, there is more debate 
about whether stock exchange listing rules restrict it.  Scholars routinely point to the New York 
 
 318 See Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 902 (“it is also permissible under federal securities 
regulation. . . . Federal securities law takes no official position regarding departures from one-share, one-
vote.”); Edelman, et al., supra note 4. 
 319 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 212(a) (2020) (making one-share one-vote the default rule and 
authorizing substantial tailoring, so long as consistent with other provisions of the statute, by the board 
alone before a stock sale and by board-shareholder approved charter amendment afterwards).      
 320 378 A.2d 121 (Del. 1977). 
 321 See Buxbaum, supra note 312, at n. 101 (“The provision allocated one vote for each twenty 
shares owned after the first fifty shares, and prohibited a stockholder from voting more than one-quarter of 
the shares issued and outstanding, unless as proxy for others. As a result, the plaintiff, who was the largest 
shareholder, had twenty-eight percent of the shares yet only three percent of the voting power.”) 
 322 Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 151(a) (2020). 
 323 The case is cited in the time weighted voting literature as an analogous structure See Edelman 
et al., supra note 4, at 999 (“The scaled voting structure in Providence & Worcester is analogous to tenure 
voting, simply substituting the limiting factor of holding duration for holding size.”) Its holding squarely 
covers one of the features that could be used to define quality voting, as discussed in Section D. 
 324 Williams v. Geier, 671 A.2d 1368 (Del. 1996) (also overruling a New York federal district court 
that purported to reject the validity of tenured voting under Delaware law, Unilever Acquisition Corp. v. 
Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 618 F. Supp. 407 (S.D.N.Y. 1985)). 
 325 The plan was neither a defensive measure, under Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 
946 (Del. 1985), requiring elevated scrutiny for reasonableness as the trial court had held, nor an 
infringement on the shareholder franchise, under Blasius Industries, Inc. v. Atlas Corp., 564 A.2d 651 (Del. 
Ch. 1988), requiring enhanced scrutiny as  the plaintiffs had urged. 
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Stock Exchange listing rule on voting rights which, by its terms, prevents a listed company from 
switching to tenured voting.326  
 But three qualifications have been made: Professor Belinfanti notes that stock exchange 
interpretive guidelines could warrant a waiver for a company with rational business concerns about 
short-termism;327 Professor Rock views any such impediment to recognized alternative voting 
regimes as ill-advised;328 and Professors Berger et al. believe that the reasoning in Providence 
should apply to the interpretation of the NYSE rules to permit tenured voting.329 
 As a matter of corporate policy, two corporate law scholars have recognized tenured voting 
as a valid method of shareholder cultivation for companies seeking a longer-term base. Belfanti 
opines: “As a cultivation tool, it rewards stewardship capital on one hand, and potentially 
discourages . . . flippers and short-term gamblers.”330 Rock stresses incentives: “it provides greater 
incentives to longer-term shareholders to invest in making those decisions and greater incentive to 
remain shareholders to enjoy the increased voting rights.”331 Rock refrains from opining on 
whether this would be desirable or not, however, noting downsides.332 On balance, though, Rock 
favors the flexibility offered:  
 In an age of empowered shareholders, in which firms should think about 
selecting and shaping an optimal shareholder base, prohibiting a key design tool is 
 
 326 E.g., Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 903, quoting NYSE listing rule: 
Voting rights of existing shareholders of publicly traded common stock . . . cannot be 
disparately reduced or restricted through any corporate action or issuance. Examples of 
such corporate action or issuance include, but are not limited to, the adoption of time 
phased voting plans, the adoption of capped voting rights plans, the issuance of super 
voting stock, or the issuance of stock with voting rights less than the per share voting rights 
of the existing common stock through an exchange offer.  
NYSE Manual, § 313.00(A). The NACD has a similar counterpart.  
 327 Belinfanti, Cultivation, supra note 62, at p 834 (quoting NYSE listed company manual: "[t]he 
Exchange's interpretations under will be flexible, recognizing that both the capital markets and the 
circumstances and needs of listed companies change over time") (citing para. 313.00 Interpretation No. 95-
01, N.Y. Stock Exch. (Jan. 10, 1995), http://nysemanual.nyse.com/LCM/pdf/voting rights.pdf). 
 328 Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 903. 
 329  Berger et al., supra note 4, at 319-320 (rule forbids “disparately” reducing voting rights whereas 
switching to a tenured voting is  non-disparate because equally applicable to all shares held for stated 
durations).    Edelman et al. are not so sure and say they are not aware of any company that has done so. 
Edelman, et al, supra note 4, at 1002-1003 (“The NYSE voting rights policy precludes companies from 
adopting tenure voting plans for existing shares. . . . most commentators agree that listing rules allow the 
adoption of tenure voting at only the IPO stage.”). 
 330 Belinfanti, Cultivation, supra note 62, at 843.  
 331  Rock, Eugenics, supra note 78, at 901-902. 
 332 Downsides are the “inverse of the upsides,” including cementing insider control despite small 
stakes. Another is this caution: “if long-term shareholders are typically index funds who, in competing on 
price, resist portfolio firm-specific investments.” Rock, supra note 78, at 902. This is an important caution 
about how a voting regime focused on horizon can be impaired by a problem of conviction. It is an example 
of the importance of combining both horizon and conviction in a single analysis as well as the need to 
recognize that not all long-term shareholders are “typically index funds.” Many are quality shareholders.   
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inappropriate. [F]irms and shareholders should at least have the option to 
experiment with different ways of shaping the shareholder base.333 
 
2. Research and Data 
 The research that reignited interest in tenured voting began with Professors Dallas, whose 
2017 work with Professor Berry investigated its implications for corporate governance and effects 
on managerial myopia.334 The article’s main points were a policy view of tenured voting and an 
examination of the dozen U.S. companies that have tried it. They considered three rationales for 
tenured voting: increasing power of long-term shareholders; encouraging longer hold periods; 
nudging corporate culture towards a long-term value focus.335  
 The study found that the plans did not reduce managerial myopia by lengthening 
shareholder holding periods.336 Nor did it affect institutional ownership or increase long-term 
ownership, which actually decreased. They found that, like dual class, tenured voting increased 
the wedge between ownership and control, as insiders could sell shares over time while 
maintaining voting power. The increased agency costs were not offset by a greater long-term 
focus.337 Despite these findings, the authors encouraged continued experimentation with tenured 
voting, stressing almost exclusively its implications concerning horizon, rather than conviction. 
 More recently, Professor Berger and co-authors propose tenured voting as a way to address 
short-termism, presenting it as a better alternative to dual-class.338 They approach the prescription 
principally in terms of time horizon, stressing perceived short-termism from shortening average 
holding periods and increased activism.339 They argue that tenured voting creates incentives to 
hold for long periods, reduces short-term myopia, attracts long-term capital, and promotes a long-
term corporate culture.340  
 Amid the authors’ impassioned entreaties focused on time horizon, there is only limited 
attention to conviction, and none to the quality shareholder. On the subject of conviction, the 
scholars say only that tenured voting should not be expected to attract any additional indexers to a 
shareholder base. That is true, of course, because indexers do not make investment decisions based 
on such firm-specific governance features.    
  Most recently, Professor Edelman and his co-authors were motivated by concerns that 
tenured voting can entrench management.341 So they analyzed its likely effect in a contested board 
 
 333 Id. at 903-904.  
 334 Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 551. 
 335 Id. at 570-571. 
 336 Id. at 620-21. 
 337 Id. at 611-12. 
 338 Berger et al., supra note 4, at 297. 
 339 Id. at 298-300. 
 340 Id. at 307-09. 
 341 Id. at 297.  This concern appears particularly strong in Italy, where critics express concern that 
the intention to elongate shareholder time horizons can also entrench managerial tenures. Chiara Mosca, 
Should Shareholders Be Rewarded for Loyalty? European Experiments on the Wedge Between Tenured 
Voting and Takeover Law, 8 Mich. Bus. & Entrepreneurial L. Rev. 245 (2019) (“tenured voting rights 
disappoint their expectations and are rarely used to meet a true need of long termism”). Such regimes do 
not increase the level of engagement of passive indexers. See Giovanni Strampelli, Are Passive Index Funds 
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election. Their model recognizes additional tenured voting power in incumbents, less voting power 
in the hands of an activist new to ownership, and variable voting power among the variety of other 
shareholders. (The model did not distinguish among varying levels of concentration or 
diversification.) They made two major findings.  
 First, when insiders of a company adopting tenured voting own and keep a sizable block—
20% to 30%—that proves a formidable deterrent to even their most committed opponents who 
might seek to acquire voting control. Second, if such insiders instead sold down to a point where 
majority voting power fell into institutional investor hands, the tenured voting mechanisms no 
longer protect the insiders’ control.  
 The upshot, for the authors, is to view tenured voting as a reasonable compromise between 
one-share/-one-vote and dual class, in that it grants incumbent inside controls an edge but only if 
they maintain substantial skin in the game. Given that finding, it would also be interesting to 
investigate the further effects of granting additional voting power based on conviction—more 
votes to concentrated than to diversified shareholders. We move to that in Section D; first consider, 
briefly, current proposals to sterilize the votes of index funds.  
 
C. Variations: Anti-Indexer 
 Corporate law scholars have identified numerous concerns about indexers casting 
shareholder votes, ranging from limited monitoring capabilities to incentives to favor managers, 
as discussed in Part III.  Calls to eliminate or curtail related shareholder voting rights ensue. All 
focus on indexer passivity—lack of conviction—rather than time horizon. 
 Professor Lund proposes for index funds to abstain from voting altogether—contrary to 
current law which requires large institutional investors to cast their ballots.342 The rationale is that 
indexers, based on the critical evidence summarized in Part III, lack requisite incentives or capacity 
to become informed about corporate voting. The effect would increase the voting power of quality 
shareholders as well as all non-indexers, whatever their time horizons or other attributes.343 
 Professors Bebchuk and Hirst oppose Lund’s proposals for two reasons. First, despite their 
criticism of indexers outlined in Part III, that does not lead them to think that the voting decisions 
of other investors are superior. Their main criticism here, however, lumps all non-indexers (and 
non-managers) together without separately recognizing the quality shareholder cohort.  
 Instead, they single out “individual retail investors,” as lacking requisite incentives to 
become informed,344 and “active mutual fund managers,” as not having shown superior investment 
in becoming informed compared to indexers.345 Attention to quality shareholders might change 
this analysis.  
 
Active Owners? Corporate Governance Consequences of Passive Investing, 55 San Diego L. Rev. 803 
(2018).   
 342 Dorothy S. Lund, The Case Against Passive Shareholder Voting, 43 J. Corp. L. 493 (2018); see 
also Todd M. Henderson & Dorothy S. Lund, Index Funds Are Great for Investors, Risky for Corporate 
Governance, Wall Street J. (June 22, 2017). 
 343 Lund, at 528-530. An alternative would focus on the perceived pro-management bias of index 
funds and allocate indexers’ votes in proportion to the votes of non-management non-indexers. See id. at 
530-31. 
 344 Bebchuk & Hirst, supra note 2, at 2218 n. 227. 
 345 Id., n. 228. 
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  A second form of anti-indexer voting measures would require the funds to pass their voting 
rights through to the beneficial owners of the fund.346 This likewise seeks to remedy the limited 
incentives and capacity the fund has to cast informed votes. Bebchuk and Hirst again disagree, 
here for three reasons, most of which are valid, though they could benefit from delineating the 
shareholder base further. As they stand, the objections are almost entirely concerned with 
individual fund beneficiaries, when indexers also manage assets for many different kinds of 
institutions (if not quality shareholders).347 
 The logical next step after these criticisms—and all three pending debates over shareholder 
voting regimes—is quality voting, an approach that zeroes in on two behaviors all participants 
seem to laud: shareholders with a long-term horizon and high level of conviction.   
 
D. Quality Voting: Pro-Quality  
  To recap this Part so far, dual class voting structures are motivated by entrepreneurs averse 
to shareholder activism or other short-term pressures, though their own economic stakes are not as 
concentrated; tenured voting is motivated by policy advocates to reduce short-termism; and anti-
indexer variations are motivated by policy advocates to negate the arguably ill-informed of 
diversified indexers. The rationale of each scheme is binary—a focus on short- or long-term 
horizon for dual class and tenured and a focus on relative concentration for the anti-indexer 
variations.  
  It is logical to consider conjoining both long-term and concentrated behavior in a voting 
policy that I will call quality voting. It refines tenured voting to account not only for duration but 
conviction.   
 Participants in the debate will have varying responses to a proposal to increase voting 
power of both long-term and concentrated shares. But while many skeptics may remain skeptics, 
some may see things differently; proponents of one or the other approach may agree or disagree 
with quality voting; those who support both may have already come to the same conclusion as this 
Article does without having yet contributed it to the literature.  
1. Comparing Regimes 
 
 346 See Caleb N. Griffin, We Three Kings: Disintermediating Voting at the Index Fund Giants, Md. 
L. Rev. (forthcoming). 
 347 Professor Griffith offers another approach which would compromise based on the type of voting 
topic in terms of whether funds have a plausible information advantage compared to their customers, 
distinguishing between, for instance, mergers versus social proposals See Sean J. Griffith, Opt-In 
Stewardship: Toward an Optimal Delegation of Mutual Fund Voting Authority, Texas L. Rev. (2020). 
While interesting, this proposal faces the definitional challenge of classifying the type of voting topic as 
well as the same issue of rational apathy of the account holders. I concur with the rationale for such an 
assertion, which is that funds and many corporate governance experts, overestimate their ability to rank 
governance provisions from good to bad on an abstract basis.    
 Professors Lund and Griffith co-authored another piece advocating an even more interesting 
approach to address conflicts of interests that index funds face.  Sean J. Griffith & Dorothy S. Lund, 
Conflicted Mutual Fund Voting in Corporate Law, 99 B.U. L. Rev. 1151, 1181-86 (2019). They look at 
conflicts arising from mutual fund structures and suggest the solution of excluding their vote in votes 
requiring a minimum level of disinterested shares to carry.  
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 Unlike dual class voting, this remains democratic. It does not inevitably or irremovably 
cement control in designated hands, but operates as a fluid advantage that fluctuate as investors 
rebalance their portfolios over time in varying weights.   
 As with tenured voting, quality voting is almost certainly permitted under corporate law—
in fact, one of the two landmark cases in this area, Providence, addressed a plan more akin to 
quality voting than to tenured voting (though it was the inverse, capping voting rights of 
concentrated shares whereas quality voting would multiply voting rights of concentrated share). 
The case under New York Stock Exchange rules remains equivocal but is stronger than for tenured 
voting, since the text of the rule expressly refers to “time phased voting plans.”348  
 Also as with tenured voting, quality voting would be a valuable shareholder cultivation 
mechanism.  It would probably be of greater effect for the discrete group of quality shareholders. 
It would pose less risk than tenured voting of entrenching managers after they decrease ownership 
because concentration levels would still be counted. It would pose none of the downside risk of 
increasing the voting power of ill-equipped indexers.  
 As with dual class and tenured voting, the exact terms could be tailored to suit.349 Reliable 
references can draw upon the selection criteria used by researchers in identifying the quality 
shareholder cohort, all of which is publicly filed with the SEC for most institutional investors and 
relatively easy for reasonable investors to determine from their regular records. 
 As to conviction, examples of such inputs are percentage of a shareholder’s portfolio in the 
stock, average stock percentage in the shareholder’s portfolio, and number of other stocks in the 
portfolio.350 Companies could access the relevant data bases of scholars who maintain ongoing 
records of shareholder quality.351  
 To illustrate, consider a simple model comparing one-share, one-vote first with tenured 
voting and then quality voting. Imagine a simple shareholder base, where the period of ownership 
of outstanding shares is about equally distributed among older and newer shareholders and those 
in between—such as 33% own for less than one year, more than three years, and in between.  
 With 99 shares outstanding, each cohort controls 33 votes. No single cohort can command 
the outcome of any vote.  But if time-weighted voting added three votes to each share held longer 
than three years, then that cohort would have 99 votes, the others would still have 33 each and a 
combined 66. The seasoned cohort would then dictate the outcome of every vote.  But it is not 
obvious that such seasoning translates into proportionally greater wisdom for a company.  
Time-weighted Voting Power  
Duration & Multiple Normal Votes Time-weighted Votes 
< Year = 1x 33 1x = 33 
 
 348 See supra note 326 (quoting the rule).  
 349 See supra text accompanying notes 302-305 (noting how dual class can vary voting rights with 
the subject matter of the vote, among other ways) and supra text accompanying note 309 (noting how 
tenured voting can vary voting power according to duration, multiple, and subject matter of the vote). 
 350 See supra text accompanying notes 56-58 (summarizing the criteria used in Professor Bushee’s 
research).  
 351 See supra text accompanying notes 59-60 (summarizing the methods and data of both Professor 
Cremers and Borochin). 
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1-3 years = 1x 33 1x = 33 
>3 yrs. =  3x 33 3x = 99 
  
 That invites consideration of quality voting. To take one of the potential proxies for 
conviction, suppose this is shares representing a substantial portion of a shareholders’ portfolio, 
measured as a percentage of the shareholders’ total public company equity portfolio. For example, 
two votes per share could be granted to shareholders allocating between one percent and five 
percent of their portfolio to the company and three votes per share to those allocating more than 
five percent. If tenured voting implicitly assumes that longer-held shares cast higher-quality votes, 
the hypothesis follows that shares owned by those with greater exposure will also have such merit.  
 To adjust the previous illustration, suppose portfolio concentration is randomly distributed 
across durations. Combining duration with concentration, the short term unconcentrated cohort 
would remain entitled to 33 votes while the longest-holding and most-concentrated would enjoy 
199 votes.  Updating the previous table that showed the effects of duration in tenured voting, This 
table adds the effects of concentration.  
Quality Voting Power  
 Duration Multiple Concentration Multiple 
None < Year   = no multiple  < 1% x = no multiple  
Some 1-3 years =  2x  1-5%    =  2x 
Substantial > 3 years =  3x > 10%   =  3x 
 
 The outcome of any vote would be determined by a fluid combination of shareholders 
boasting relatively longer durations and higher concentrations. To complete the illustration, the 
next table applies the multiples to the previous example of a company with 99 shares outstanding, 
with 33 each held for varying durations and concentrations.   
 
Votes Given Combinations of Concentration and Duration 
                      Concentration   
Duration                                          
< 1% = no multiple 1% to 5% = 2x >5% = 3x 
< 1 year = no multiple  33 66 99 
1-3 years = 2x  66 132 165 
>3 years = 3x 99 165 198 
Shared area reflects number of votes commanded given concentration and duration levels.  
 (This example presents the multiples in the proportion of 1-2-3. That is a high magnitude 
of change in multiples, which may be too large for comfort in an experimental stage. More modest 
multiples could be set, such as 1, 1.33, 1.66 or even 1, 1.2, 1.4.) 
2. Pros and Cons 
 Quality voting can be adopted by charter amendment under state corporation law along 
with an application to the stock exchange for a waiver of any restrictions on alternative voting 
regimes. In this legal sense, it is akin to dual class or tenured voting—all of which are easier than 
the variations of anti-indexer regimes, which would require legal changes and related political 
support.  
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 As with dual class and tenured voting, quality voting enables each company to design the 
details and tailor the arrangements to suit in a joint exercise involving solely board and shareholder 
approval. Each company must weigh the following costs and benefits of adoption. 
 Administrative burdens may be high. While the five-year old experience in France suggests 
that administration is feasible, the U.S. system has some different features.  One problem is how 
most U.S. equity is held in the names of depository nominees rather than ultimate owners, 
complicating the task of tracking ownership concentration.352 Recordkeeping and calculations can 
be complex, especially for large institutions investing through multiple funds, including those with 
diverse mixes of debt, equity, and other securities.353 
 In fact, companies that rescinded tenured voting often cited administrative complexity as a 
reason.354 Administering commitment-weighted voting would pose additional cost, particularly in 
recordkeeping and verification. For example, duration is a fixed measure of time, whereas 
concentration can vary substantially over time.  
 On the other hand, those maintain tenured voting invoked common solutions. For example, 
one common solution to the challenge of street name ownership was to deem street name stock as 
low-vote.355 Such an approach could be modified by making that a presumption that each 
shareholder would have the right to challenge.  
 Such a simple approach can be implemented immediately for all shareholders, including 
individuals, by shifting the burden of disclosure to the shareholder: any shareholder wishing to 
exercise quality shares would be required to submit qualifying evidence to the corporate secretary 
accordingly. The corporate secretary can create uniform rules describing what evidence qualifies 
and standardized procedures to verify it.  
 Moreover, holdings are readily observable from public filings for institutional investors 
and can be verified by reference to disclosure that is legally required and subject to federal anti-
fraud rules. For these shareholders, enhanced voting power could be made optional and subject to 
the company’s confirmation of verified shareholder applications. 
 
 352 See Edelman, supra note 4, at 297 (drawing on David C. Donald, Heart of Darkness: The 
Problem at the Core of the U.S. Proxy System and Its Solution, 6 Va. L. & Bus. Rev. 41, 50 (2011)). In 
brief, before the 1970s, share ownership records were maintained manually in a traditional paper recording 
system maintained by individual brokerage firms. Trading volume proved too much for such a system, 
however, creating backlogs in updating transfer records. To meet this challenge, the industry developed a 
computerized system maintained in a central depository, called the Depository Trust Company (DTC). 
Today, the vast majority of stock is held through DTC, with stock formally owned by its nominee, Cede & 
Co., and held in the name of the brokerage firm that arranged the purchase (called “street name” on behalf 
of the “beneficial” owner). 
 353 Corporations must maintain stockholder lists to determine associated rights, on voting and other 
matters. E.g., Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 219(a) (2020). In the process, companies contact DTC to enumerate 
the breakdown of brokers holding shares through Cede. The Cede breakdown can be cumbersome, involve 
numerous interactions between the company and DTC, and is error-prone. Edelman, et al., supra note 4, at 
1004. Such challenges and risks multiply for companies with peculiar voting rules, such as tenured voting, 
as this requires additional information such as duration of holdings.  
 354 See Edelman, supra note 4, at n. 89 (quoting Church & Dwight Co., Inc., Proxy Statement (Form 
PRE 14A), at 27 (Mar. 21, 2003)). 
 355 See Dallas & Barry, supra note 9, at 602. 
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 Just as technology helped solve the paper crisis, technology is likely again to solve the 
street name problem, including the administration of special voting rules.   Advances in tracking 
technology, particularly digital ledgers based on blockchain tools, promise to make administration 
of quality voting manageable.  In 2017, Delaware corporate law was amended to permit companies 
to use blockchain (or distributed ledgering) to maintain their shareholder lists.356 These enable 
digital records showing every transaction involving every share of stock, with precise details of 
beneficial rather than street ownership as well as duration and other data.357 
 In any event, such costs must be compared to the gains. In general, gains can be 
approximated by reference to some of the common contexts where suboptimal voting has been 
recognized.  These would include many of the instances where indexers have conflicts of interest 
as well as the legal contexts in which courts have recognized transient shareholder appetites to be 
problematic. 
 Under quality voting, finally, activist shareholders may often gain enhanced power when 
they hold meaningful stakes for long periods. Voting power could also increase during the course 
of multi-year campaigns, as more votes accrue over time. Both points may attract activists, but 
while managers may see some associated costs, they will be activists more patient and focused 
than other shareholders, producing comparative gains.    
CONCLUSION 
 Why have quality shareholders, including Warren Buffett, been neglected in the corporate 
law scholarship on horizon, conviction and shareholder voting? One possibility is the familiar 
difference between theory and practice. Scholars work with theories that may or may not map onto 
actual behaviors. A tension sometimes resides between academic and practical perspectives in 
scholarly work.358   
 In corporate law and finance scholarship last generation, for instance, a disconnect 
occurred between modern finance theory and Buffett.359  Theorists developed the efficient capital 
market hypothesis, capital asset pricing model, and modern portfolio theory as a construct that 
contradicted most everything Buffett thought and did—the theorists even suggested he could not 
have done what he did.360 The theories being developed in today’s corporate law debates recall a 
flavor of that gap, where the light shines on short-term activists and long-term indexers but none 
at all on the long-term concentrated, quality shareholder.  
 As Professor Bebchuk and his colleagues have noted in one of their many major 
contributions to the conviction debate, they are putting forward a theory of institutional investor 
 
 356  Del. Code Ann. tit. 8, § 219(c) (2020). 
 357 See	Edelman,	supra	note	4,	at	1006	(these	tools	would	be	a	“great advantage” for tenure 
voting to “make it easier for companies to trace the identity of their shareholders and therefore more 
accurately assign high and low voting rights”). 
 358 See, e.g., Eric A. Posner, Standards, Rules, and Social Norms, 21 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 101, 
106 (1997) (exploring a theoretical model that has little practical use).   
 359 See Lowenstein, supra note 24, at 934. 
 360 Id. (reviewing finance theory of the era which theorists simply ignored Buffett’s record, wished 
it away, or dismissed him as an outlier: “it is odd, is it not, that not one EMT theorist has seen fit to study 
Buffett?” and their “response to Buffett has been either a deafening silence or a clumsy attempt to avoid 
the engagement.”). 
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incentives that predicts impoverished decision making while acknowledging that actual decision 
making may be superior to the model.361  Other scholars in this debate likewise theorize and model 
without necessarily accounting for all relevant incentives of all the diverse actors, especially 
quality shareholders.  
 “Well, it may be all right in practice, but it will never work in theory,” Buffett has famously 
quipped.362 Quality shareholding works in practice, and requires only slight adjustment to work in 
theory.  Both theory and practice will be richer when horizon and conviction are combined for 
study and the quality shareholder’s role is explored. This Article lights the way.   
 
 361 Bebchuk, Cohen & Hirst 237, at 90: 
We recognize that well-meaning investment managers of index funds and active mutual 
funds may sometimes make stewardship decisions that are superior to those suggested 
purely by their incentive calculus. Our focus, however, is on understanding the structural 
incentive problems that should be recognized in assessing the current governance 
landscape. 
 362  See Katherine Florey, Big Conflicts Little Conflicts. 47 Ariz. St. L.J. 683, 685 (2015) (quoting 
Buffett’s “famous quip”). 
